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Humar. factors, such · as ethics and education, are important 
factors in network information.security. This thesis determines 
which human ,factors have significant influence on network 
secur1ty. Those factors are examined in relation to current 
security devices and procedures. Methods are introduced to 
evaluate security effectiveness by incorporating the appropriate 
human factors into network security controls. 
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Networks hav.e greatly increased. the utility of coruputer 
systems, allowing multiple users in diVers-e geog:t'aphic 
positions to share scarce or 1:1niqu~ resources.. The same 
factors that make networks desirable, however, also increase 
their risks and vulne.:-abilities. The' ease with which nf;ttwork 
resources car. be accessed from many entry , point<J raises 
concerns about \Ulauthorized access, disc~osure, or 
modification of data by unauthorized personnel. 
Most effort put forth in the field of network security 
focuses on the technical aspects of security ct:mtrols. A 
neglected aspect of network secu~ity is the effect that human 
:fa~tors, such .&s user acceptance of ·controls, management 
support, and the ethical environment of the orgar~ize.tion, ha~re 
on the effectiveness of· the controls .~ .. 1 place. 
Given that no hardware or software controls can function 
efficiently without the ~uppor.t o'f those who work with them, 
the area of human factors in network securi'.;.y . c:untrol·s i.s 
important to the overall unders~anding and enhancement of 
secu4'it1 c:ontrols 
envirol'Unent. 




This thasis will identify ~he issues that are i.mporta\\t in 
& discussion of network aecux:ity human factors. It 1till 
examine security de·Tices and procedures that are currently in 
use, a.nd explore th.e way human factors l:.ffect their 
functionality. The . factors that influence security 
moti vaticm~ will be considered, and meth.~ds to enhance network 
security controlc1 usil'g: these factors will be developed. 
C. RES~CB·QUBSTION 
The primary research question cf this thesis is: 'What are 
the human factors th&t affect network security? A subsidiary 
question is: How can· a security' manager utilize these factors 
to enhance security in his/her organization? 
D. SCOPB, LIMI'l'A'!~ONS AND ASSU'MP'l'IOHS 
The scope of t.his thesis includes only those securit1 
controls that have a nC".It'iceable effect on the user. Controls 
such as· ~nd-to-~nd.enc&~ption of data is of cour$e a network 
security control, but it is transparent to the user,· and tnus 
~ill not be addres~ed. Onl7 controls ~oticeable by the user 
are relevant to ~his subject. 
Limitations of the res'!~rch effort are the lack of · 
significant prior inquiry into the subject. Materials used in 
the rese~rc:h .were ·widely scattered about the literature of 
computer' securit·y, ~sychology, and h•.1man engineering. 
2 
.·.· 
Assumptions made in this work are that the reader has a 
working familiarity with computers, in particular the 
potential problems associated with network access to 
information. 
B. 01\GANIZATI.ON . Cl' S'l'ODY 
The remaining chapters of this thesis examine the 
pertinent issues in human factors security, and discuss how 
these factors affect currently . used secu~ity • devices and 
procedures. Factors that influence the users security 
motivations and environment are then considered. Finally, a 
capstone chapter synthesizes the security controls with the 








II • ISSOBS IN HUMAN !'ACTORS SBCtJlUTY 
A. SI:COIU''n' COHCJ:!UfS 
Concerns for safeguardir.g information in networks 
generates tremendous interest in computer security in the 
United States. The average. computer-related theft is 
estimated at between. $400,000 and $600,000 (Sobol, l98a) . 
u·. s. sale3 of physical computer security equipment will reach 
4.1 billion by 1993, up 33% from 1986 {Klopp, 1990). Tbe fact 
that this data is available suggests the importance it holds 
for b~siness. There is no comparable data available for the 
dollars spent on developing new security procedures, or 
educating users in security methods. There is no data 
available even on .the amount of ·losses as compared' ,with ADP 
expen~itures. This information is lacking because many 
organizations disregard these aspeets of seeurity eompletely, 
and others give them only token acknowledgement. 
· . Computer security in modern n~tworked information system~ 
'is . crucial t:o the acceptance and growth of electronic networks 
· in the future. Besides the financial costs mentioned, .tt1f0 
other factors stimulate interest in netwcr~ data seeurity. 
These are; extens'ive teleeot'ftlaUniea.t·ions systems b.indin9 
networks together, and th• e~n~9rn for individual and 
corporate privacy that networks threaten to erode. Wide use 
4 
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of teleprocessing systems, leading inevitably to the handling 
, of sensith·e data, generates concern 'tor many reasons. 
For example, data communication networks are used. for 
elaborate message systems such as electrcnic mail. These e-
mail syst&ms transmit.information between office systems on· a 
large scale. Much of 1:1"-e information carried. is sensitive and 
needs protection against eavesdropping. Another example is 
the use of data networks for transmitting and authorizing 
payments. These messages must be authenticated and protected 
from tampering, to prevent fraudulent alteration. 
The second interest-stimulating factor is concern about 
privacy of the individual user. There is a threat to this 
privacy in the handling of personal information in computer 
systems. Electronic privacy law is beginning to operate in 
technically advanced countries. Such laws require that 
personal information is· safeguarded, and accessed only with 
· proper authorization. In network applic:;:ations, sensitive 
I 
info ation should be sec'l,lre~ against wrongful access. 
many organizations, access to this sensitive 
ation is less restricted than in the past, due .to the 
tralization of data that. networks allow. Data that 
prev· ously wa.l centrally controlled has· migrated onto desktop 
Per3onnel 'information,· financial data, or even 
busi.ness information l'ftight reside on a desktop 
ter used ~y one or more employees. This information, if 
not rotected,· is accessible by any -.:omputer-literate person 
s 
'i 
.who happens l;>Y. A security system i·s necessary to protect the 
informC\tio~ of the organization and its employees. 
Security has business benefits as well. It has the 
expected a"ivantages of information integrity. A good security 
system also greatly reduces the normal administrative and 
operational misuse of system resources. 
B. BtJMAH rACTORS 
1. Bt.hic• 
The field of ethics focuses on our relations with 
others and their property. Information technology cre~tes new 
and unfamiliar rel•tionships. The concepts of property and 
ownership take on different meanings when applied to 
information rather than to tangible property. 
For example, if you have a car, and someone takes it, 
you no longer have a car; you are deprived of the posseosion 
and use of your property. However, if you have some 
information. stor~d in electronic media, , and someone copies it, 
you still have possession and use of the information. 'i'his is 
an area where our societal ethics are still beinc; develo~·ed, 
sine~ the probl~ has only been around for a re!atively short 
time. 
Sorting 'out the priorities b~t.ween the r'ight to know 
versus the right to privacy is another difficult task; Our 
basic drive with respect to property. is to accumulate and 
protect, but for information, it is to communicate. and to 
,··' 
share. Thus, information protection can run counter to our 
fundamental traits. 
It is difficult to modify these traits when there 
exists a general lack of "informational ethics" role models 
within the computer world. Organizations to which people 
normally look for athical leadership, such as church, school, 
government, and home, currently lack the technical kno-wledge, 
budget, or the awareness to deal with the subject as it 
applies to the present electronic world. Normally accepted 
role models are not present for informational ethics. 
Securi~y efforts can be sortea into three areas; 
technological, organizational, and behavioral. The technical 
approaches are many, and have an excess of supporters and 
vendors to keep us aware. Organizational security efforts 
· involve compartmenta~ization of information and restriction of 
knowled9e. Greater degrees of compartmentalization yield. 
greater security, but can subtract from .the company's 
efficiency and effectiveness. ·For thia reason, profit-
motivated entitieB 'are 'pr(!ne to rely lf"-9 on thi:t method than 
on tecbnology. 
The behav:i,oral methods seem to have attracted little 
attention. Perhaps this is true becaus• it is easy to focus 
on technological advances, of which th'!:re. is a great supply. 
It is ·much more difficult, som-?t:imo!s impossible, to modify 
behavior and attitudes. Figure la shows how technology and 
organization are commonly used a~ th~ only inl'uts to security 
7 




in a system. Figure lb is the way human behavi9ral factors 
actually influence security by acting on the two primary 
inputs. This influence must be acknowledged and incorporated 
into any integrated security effort. 
111 
rigur& 1. (a) Current View, (b) Human Factors Influence 
Technological security devices, hardware and software 
based, can be tremendous aids in securing computer networks. 
Without vigilant human beings, however, the value of security 
t~hnology is severely limited. If no one reviews the login 
audit f'iles, or responds to intruder alert alarms, even the 
best security devices are useless. Witho.ut a well-trained· and 
highly mot'iva\;ed staff,' the computer ays.tem simply cannot work 
efficiently. Wh~n teehnolocrJ has. <;tone its best, human factors 






Security of informa~ion is just as dependant on the 
user accepting his security responsibilities as i~ is on the 
data security officer doing his job. By involving human 
factors, though, security systems·design and implementation 
becomes extremely complex and confusing. 
A primary contributor to the confusion is the lack of 
a clearly defined code of ethics for the "Electronic 
!~formation Age". Electronically· stor~.:i and transmitted 
information makes our existing ethical codes difficult to 
apply clearly and consistently, for many reasons. 
In this climate of ambiguous informational ethics, 
network security practitioners should understand that focusing 
on the human aspects of security c.tn yield far great"!r 
ben~fits than concentrating on the machine aspects. 
2. Bdueation 
Computer security personnel have,long been aware of 
the danger of malicious remote threat, but have not .often 
addressed it as a major problem. This is because other 
issues, such as programming a~d hardware errors, data entry 
errors, and s.oftware maintenance uvershadow the ·remote access 
. "'SUe. 1 
Security pro~lems often t.ake a back. seat· to other 
organizational problems, because common wisdom says that 
security violations arg rare occurrences. Priority is th~s 
given usually to other.matters. A better measure of the need 






for good security practices than the number of incidents is 
the potential impact of a single incident. 
In today' s complex networked en,,.ironment, one person 
could thecretica.lly disrupt a major financial, transportation, 
manufacturing, or public service network. In the case of a 
medical· information system, this may even cause loss of life. 
'!'his problem transcends simple security consciousness and goes 
back to the previously discussed importance of ethical 
principles. 
Destruction of information is the most o~vious of all 
penetrations. Its effects can range from the ·inconvenience of 
having to restore data from backup tapes, to bringing a 
business to a halt if the information is not backe~ up. 
With unauthorized modification of information, the 
risks are. consider~ly higher. 'l'he modification may not be 
' detected until it is ~oo late, if at all. Meanwhile, the . 
organi~ation may have made decisions using the modified data 
as if it were accurate. 
Unautho~ized retrieval of information is the most 
difficult to detect. The .information is not missing, nor is. 
it chang-ed, but ita unauthorized dis.semination has the 
potential of a. far mor• serious impact. than . the· other twc:> 
possibilities. 
Until the security issu~ is s~en as equally important, 
and given a priority at least equal to the, d~y to day 
mcint~nance of networks, inf~rmation systems will be expoeed 
:lo 
,----.- ------~---------;-~~-------- ------ .. .•' 
• 
to more potuntial riek through misuse of data than these other 
issues of data entry &nd program errors offer altogether. 
The beginnings of a trend in the corr~ct direction is 
emerging as m~re compu~er-li't.ero.te people enter the workforce.· 
Many'more are capable now of understanding and manipulating 
non-secure s~stems . This makfts potential problems more 
likely, thus security will receive more attention. 
C. SOLtJ'l'IONS 
When pr?tecting a network's security, managers must be 
aware of who are potential intruders. Users of information 
can be intruders. Provider~, or the dsvelopers o'f information 
systems, can be intruders. Servlcers of the system can be 
intruders. Emphasis is usually assigned to protect against 
the outs ida . intru~er or · the hacker. This emphasis is 
misplaced. The potential intruders insi ~:. L,e organization 
are far more dangerous than the random hac).;~·~:. The people who 
commit computer crimes most frequently are legitimate users of 
the sys~em (Zimmerman, 1984) .· 
To protect against these malicious users, designers of 
networks need to know.three things about the people who will 
use the system.. Firat, what are their abilities and ski~ls? 
This refers to their technical knowledge ,and abilities. If 
y~ur us~~s are sophisticat~d and knowledgeabl~, the sist~m 
must be designed with sophisticated and ~urrent defenses. 
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Second, what are their inabilities? An example is the 
inability of most people to remember random passwords without 
writing them down. The designer should be aware of this 
inability so that it may not b~ exploited against the system. 
Third, the designer must know what the users will want to 
do, what their motivations are. If the users are programmers, 
they will likely be more c~rious, and likely to cballenge the 
system than da1:.a entry personnel. Procedures should be set up 
to curb this· curiosity, or provide outlets for it that will 
not compromise the system. 
In any system where people ~re involved, security 
procedures must address the human aspects. People in our 
society are not usually security oriented. People m&. ke 
errors; people commit crimes; and peopltt are vul'nerable to 
bri~ery and threats~ ' 
For example, how often have you seen remote access 
terminal rooms with account numbers and passwords written on 
blackboards in the room~ O·r well-secured computer facilities 
--:-with the ,side door propped open. so employees C&Jl get some 
' 'I I 
fresh air. Or people using coded identification cards to pass 
through secured gates -- and then holding the ·gate .open for 
another per~on . 
. These· are common, well-aceept~d everyday· habits of 
ordinary people. U"fot·tunately, th"!y ~re precisely, the types 
of behavior that give security officers headache's. Because it 




be r~aliEtically factored into ~ny security system. As long 
as ·human beings are a functional part of a computer security 
system, the system is unavoidably vulnerable to the physical 
·and moral weakness~s contained in the hum~ make~p. 
The responsibility of securlty professionals is to 
convince the people who use computers that tiley should be 
concerned about security. The path to enlightenment is a · 
dangerous one, .though. In making computer systems secure, 
users must usually adopt or conform to practices to which they 
are unused. They may resent these, and this will likely slow 
down their use of the syst~m. 
In creating:secure computing environments, we must avoid 
appearing to propos~ a "Red Flag Act". 2 Security procedures 
need to be developed that users are comfortable with,. and with 
which they feel it is' in t~eir own interest to comply. 
To develop effective· and apprC'priate sec,uri~y procedures, 
involvement · is required at all levels. Concerned. users, 
experienced t;echnical specialists, and others with appropriate 
security kno~ledge must cooperate durir. ... all phases of system 
development. Those who know how to incorporate security 
controls into syst.ems have to take the l~ad. in .sett~ng a 
secu~ity-receptive development environment. 
a·When the automobile was fir~t int.roduc~d into Great 
Britain, it brought with it th~ unfortunate phenomena of 
traffic fatalities. In response, the government· introduced a 
law requiring all cars to be preceded by a man on foot waving 
a red flag. Although greatly incre~sing safety, this act had 
the effect of ·limiting the auto tc- th~ speed of a walking man. 





Included in the required levels of involvemant is upper 
management. Just as with any program in an ~rganization, 
management support is requi'red for a security program to be 
effective·. Managem9nt needs to be involved in the security 
process. They are the people who authorize and fund security 
programs, and their attitude toward system security sets the 
tone for the organizational attitude. 
D • NB'l'WOIUC SI:COIU'l'Y IN 'fBI: DOD 
Computer secu~1ty in the Federal Government is addressed 
by the Computer 'security Act of 1987, which mandates "period,ic 
training for all persons who manage, use, or operate Federal 
computer systems containing sensitive information." (US 
Congress, 1987) Unfortuna~ely, the generalities oi the Act 
have not led to many specific guidelines for information 
syst-3m security .. 
The Department of the Navy, however, recognizes that the 
proliferation of ADP systems in the. military brings with it 
special security concerns ' related to network -~vironment's 
(Department of ~he Navy;--1988). It sets out guidelines fot 
risk management and sets minimwr. requirements for physical 
security, but has 110. specific procedures to follow. It Jnerely 
assigns respon~.i.hility.tor·program ct~v~lopm~nt, and defines 
the termff introduced in the ins+: t ~-'·-·': _;_t•n itself. 
SECNAVNOTE 5230, the ADP Control Guidelines, comes closer 




t • • • • • 
1988) . It discus&es · set~ing computer security policies, 
segregation of duties in & network environment, and the need 
for traini.ng programs. Specific methods fer allowing access 
to terminals, reviewing user lists, and classifying data are 
also included. This instruction is the most useful of those 
available in addressing human·factor issues of s&curity, yet 
if falls far short of being compr~hensi~e, or even detailed 
enough to do more than sot general guideliues. 
The ·reason 7or this dearth of network security documents 
is that this is a new area of responsibility· for the military. 
The Federal government only recogni%ed the issue in 1987. The 
'services have thus had only 3 years to begin progr~s. The 
current state of network security programs in the military is 
one of overall policy statements, general responsibilities, 
and the beginnings of training requirements. 
B. SOMtGRY 
This chapter has detailed the human factor issuee 
surrounding network ~ecurity. Interest in network security is 
motivated by people's need !or p~ivacy. That the need for 
privacy direc~ly contradicts our societal a~titude toward 
sharing information e~eates a difficult. and complex problem. 
To solve this· problem, .efforts must f-:-cus on its causes, human 
n4!eds . and motivations. Only w5.':'t this focus will the 
technology-orif;tnted se<=7urity d<!!vic<:!s in use be able to 
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function effecti.vely. Th-:. next chapters will examine these 
devices, and current security proceduras ·that attempt to 
address these issues. 
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III. NBTWOIUt DA.'l'A DAMAGB .AND SJ:CURI'l'Y DEVICES 
A. IN'l'RODOC'l'ION 
This chapt~r introduces the types of damage that can occur 
in a system, descri]:\es various security devices that are 
currently available, and discusses the strengths and 
weaknesses of these devices from a human factor perspective. 
Traditional network security focuses on two areas, "devices" 
' ' 
and "procedures". Technology generally supports the devices 
area, with hardware and software devices that restrictaccess 
to the system, or to the system's data. Discussion of the 
devices available in this area is appropriate ~or this thesis. 
As these device~ ·are all concerned with some aspect of the 
human user, human factors come into play. Procedures are 
methods that use~ organizational structures, such a~ 
compartmentaliz'ation of project teams, to control the 
dissemination of sensitive data. The goal Of both aroas,is. 
to limit or eliminate the potential for damage to the network. 
B • PO'l'BN'l'I.AL' SYS'l'BM DAMAGE . 
· There are several way's in which harm to or loss of data 
can occur in a network, with varyiJ1g d'!!grees of damage. 
1. Dest:ructio'.l or cont.amination 
Data can b~ •removed from th~ system, or garbled so 
badly that it is rendered useles.-;: to the organi:o:ation. 
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Depending on the data, this may or may not haore serious 
consequences. For instance,. the destruction of a list of 
attendees at last year's Christmas party may not be cause for 
alarm in the board room. On the other hand, employee pay 
records, or data that has been compiled at substantial cost to 
the organization may well be irreplaceable, and its 
destruction might be enough · to cause the failure of the 
organization itself.· 
2 . Theft or cli•clo•ure 
In this instance, "theft" can.actually mean "copied". 
This difference is important. When our ·society thinks of 
something being stolen, the normal conclusion is that.some 
piece of property has been tak9n from its owner, and the 
owner no longer has it. However, data may be copied by an 
unauthorized ~rson, yet the owner of the data still possesses 
it, ·and may not even know that it is no longer his alone~ The 
mistaken assumption that the data is still ex~lusive knowledge 
may lead the organization to make poor decisions based on this 
false premise. 
3. Modification 
Programs that are essential to t~e health of the 
organization, or data that runs in these programs, must be 
highly protected. Changes in the pro~iframs ·or their dat·a c·ould 
easily lead to reduced organi:a.ti?nal effectiveness. A 
possible scenario would involve a program for a petrochemical 
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either the code for developing the forecast, or the data 
leading to the drilling decision were changed, ,the company 
could spend enormous a.'noum:.s of resources drilling in areas 
with no possibility of success, and ignoring areas of likely 
oil deposits. 
4. Interruption or denial o~ aer.ice 
Even if data ·is not actually destroyed or tampered 
with, damage to the organization can occur if required 
services are interrupted or delayed. ~ese could include 
payroll processing, database updating, or financial transfers. 
5. baourcea uaed in eliminating intruc:lera 
If computer personnel are required to spend time 
isolating which user on a system is causing damage, this is 
time and resources th~: are not being spent in productive 
work. Finding and eliminating · a disruptive user· can taka 
quite a bit of time, as an a~tempt ls usually made to keep the 
search covert (Stoll, 1989) . 
6 . Public eillbarrasa~Aent 
Many organizations, such as a b~:--ks, depend upo their 
reputation 6f sec.tirity and trUstworthiness for their. b sines's 
·success . News of computer system infiltration co ld do 
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C. ACCESS CONTROLS 
In all these cases, the degree of damage or amount of loss 
depends upon the criticality of the data accessed or of the 
function denied. For example, if the file containing the data 
for the la~~ 10 years worth of annual reports is copied from 
the system, there is likely to be little effect. This is 
already public knowledge. However, if the data which will 
comprise the upcoming annual report is compromised, the 
organization could be severely affected. 
This degree of criticality leads to various levels of 
protection o£ data . 
the data itself. 
At the most basic level is encryption of 
. The technoloqy for th.i.s method is well 
advanced, and definitely has 4 place in any secure network. 
However, encryption is generally invisible to the user, ~aking 
place a level far below that with which the user interfaces. 
Encryption s~fequards data from interpretation by making the 
transmitted data unintelligi!)le, but it does not restrict 
access to the data. Access control measures, on th~ other 
hand, , guard network resources by preventing unauthorized. 
ac:ess. The two secur~ty methods coruplement one another and 
are more effective when combined. Encryption has littl~ or no 
· effect on the human factors involved in network secur;ty, and. 
so will not be further discussed her•. · 
When access control ~easure9 are used, human factors do 
co~e into play. Factors such as the ability· to remember a 






fingerprint analysis, or the time it takes to key in ID 
numbers with a magnetic stripe card. 
User authentication mechanisms can be divided into three 
cat~gories: 
What you know, such as a password 
· What your possess, such as a token 
· Something about you, such as a fingerprint 
1. P••••orda 
Passwords are probably the most common type of 
security device in use. A password is merely a sequence of 
letters, numbers, and/or symbols, that the system correlates 
with a unique user ID. The user inputs his ID and passworQ 
into the system in order to gain access. The user ID is 
usually nothing more than the user's last name, but the 
corresponding password for that user ID is known only to' the 
user, and must be input to the system, otherwise access is 
denied. 
The theory here is that a user will ~eep his password 
secret. If it is known to no one else, then no one else 
should be ~le to access his account. In practice, however, 
use~s often pick passwords 'tha; are easiiy guessed. Spouse~ 
children, or pets names are o~ten used . While usually not. 
that obvious, the vast majority o~ passwords hold personal 
signi.~icance for t~he user. They. are thus are vulnerable to a 
"guessing" attack by an intruder with knowledge of the user's 
personal data, such as might be found in a personnel file, or 
through ~riendly association with the user. 
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While this me;thod of "reasonabie guessing" can usually· 
discover one or two passwords in a large system,_ the more 
dangerous type of password attack is a "brute force" or 
"dictionary" attack. In this ·scenario, e~ch word in a 
dictionary is tested as a_ possl.:ble password. With a computer 
program doing the testing and iteration, many thousands of 
words can be tested in a relatively short time, and with 
little effort from the human attacker. 
There are several ways to increase the security of a 
password from both of these types of attack. The first action 
t • I ' 
to take, though, is to r8.strict users from se~ecting passwords 
that ref·lect · information contained in their personnel files. 
The examples mentioned-earlier, such as family member names, 
can be extended to include street names, pJ:ior cities lived 
in, et~. This policy alone will virtually eliminate the 
~ility to compromise a password through guesswork a~one. 
A good pas&word has the following characteristics 
(Pfleeger, 1989) . These ~haracteristics are "good~ from a 
'' 
purely security-oriented point o~ view. ~hat is, they all 
contribvte to the added security of a password, pro~ided the 
password ·.is used· ~s intended: These cha.racted.stics do not 
take. into account how the·user c'ould react to their imposition' 
upon his password~ Following the deseript~on of each 
characteristic is a comment on its h•.1man factors impact. 
22 
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· It is composed of lette~.s, digits, and other 
characters, so that the :Oa.se alphabet fo'r an exhaustive 
att_ack is large. 
The number of possible combinations from a set of 
cha~acters is x~, where x is the number of legal characters, 
and y is the length of the password. If x, that is the base, 
is increased by the ability to use digits ~d symbols.as well 
as letters, the base is significantly enlarged. From 26 
possible letters, it goes to 26 letters, 10 .digits, and at 
least 15 s}rmbols such as @, t, and $. This is a beneflt to the 
security of the password if it· falls under attack. 
However, passwords composed of random characters are 
difficult for people ~o remember. A password such as 
"!r5*h+2" is unlikely to remain off paper very long. A user 
is likely to write such a password down, probably next to the 
terminal he uses the most. This practice is definitely not 
secure! 
Another problem with a password such as this is that 
it is prone to keyboard error. The possibility of ruis-keying 
is high, and this will qause extreme ~ser frustration. It is 
'also possi~le that.the user may attempt to write some sort of 
script file for log-on to eliminate key-in errors. In that 
case anyone would be· able to log-on using the. script file, and 
the password would become moot. 
It is long, so that there are many possibilities for an 
exhaustive 'attack. 
The length of a · pa~s.word direct-ly affects the 





from simple mathematics. Consider a password that is 5 
characters long and may·only consist of letters. There are 
265 possible combinations available. By increasing the length 
of t~e password, the number of combinations rises 
exponentially. 
This advantage is reduced considerably, however; by 
the introduction of human factors. The n~er of possible 
combinations consists mostly of random orderings of letters. 
'' ' 
As already discussed, people are unlikely to be able to 
remember a password such as "v#rpdm%qz", so they are unlikely 
to choose such a password. 
People are more likely to choose short, easy to 
remember passwords, such as their initials, their wife's'name, 
or the street on which they live (Haigh, 1984). If they are 
restricted from using passwords that are easily remembered, 
they will resort to writing them down. This is' still not a 
good security practice. ' 
· It is not a common 
attack,will fail. 
or.name, so that a dictionary 
A dictionary attack ·a the1 uae of a computer program 
to try thousands of differe t passwords in an attempt to 
infiltrate the system. · Th password guesses come from a 
.dictionary stored in r memory, often the attacked 
computer's own me~ory. 
If passwords are from coming from the 
subset of words contained , dictionaries, than a 





is that many common words appear in the dictionary, and these 
are fikely to be ones that a user would choose. Forcing the 
user to forego words from the dictionary greatly limits his 
choicP.s, and could cause some resentment. 
· It is an unlikely password, not a characteristic' 
related to the possessor, such as a spouse's name or a 
street address . 
A great number of users choose pa~swords that are 
names of people close to them, or of . other personal 
significance (Haigh, 1984). While easy to remember, (this is 
why they are· chosen), such passwo~ds are ~lso easy for an 
intruder who knows the user to guess. This makes them less 
secure than they could be. 
From the humap standpoint, these type of passwords are 
very desirable. Using names o~ family members lends a !eeling 
of comfort to the act of logging on, and m&kes the computer 
' ' . 
system less alien. Restricting. these type of passwords frem 
use is understandable from the security viewpoint, but 
disliked by the user. 
It is frequently changed, so thr.· even in the event of 
.someone's guessing it,. the peri·,;, of·vulneJiability is. 
short. 
The security advantages of this procedure are obvious . 
The leas time a password is valid, the less time an intruder 
has to find it out. Users, ·how~ver, ·do not like· to change 
passwords. They grow comfortabl~ wi+;,h one, and it is easier·· 
to remember just one. In one case, a system required changing 
passwords monthly. One user changed his twice. on each 
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changeover day, once to a new one, then immediately back to 
his old one (Haigh, 1984). 
· It is not written down, so that it will .not be found. 
This is also obviously a good security practice. 
However, for the reasons already discussed, it a passw~rd is 
restricted from being within the group of commonly chosen, 
easily remembered passwords, it 'is quite l~kely to be written 
down. 
2. P .. 8plu:aaea 
One form of authentication that is similar to a 
password, but far more secure, is ~he passphrase. The 
pa3sphrase is basically a longer version of the password. The 
argument concerning password length indicated that there are 
relatively few long passwords that people can remember easily. 
Examples of passphrases ·could be a line from a, song o~ a poem. 
This would make a lengthy authenticator quite easy to 
remember. The important point to make about passphrases is 
that the user chooses his ·own. This makes it a more personal 
it·em, and more l,lkely that it wi~l be remembered 'without being, 
written down. 
Although the passphrase takes aomewhat longer to enter 
into a computer system ttian the shorter password, the 
increased ability of people to remember a lengthy phrase 'as 
opposed to a lengthy random passvt"rd is worth the small amount 








A token is the general name for an object that 
authenticates its possessor. For example, royalty used to be 
authenticated by a signet ring, and i~"l many applications today 
people authenticate by ID cards. In order to be useful, a 
token must be unforgeable and unique. In practice, ID cards 
can be forged, but they are still used for authentication . 
The "magnetic stripe" card is une form of token that 
can be used for network authentication. These cards are 
regular credit cards with certain information recorded in 
magnetic form on the back. The magnetic stripe is reaCi by a 
sensing machine. Currently, . this is often· a machine that 
permits a customer to perto~ banking transactions day or 
night. These cards are not co. ;;;J.ete proof ot authentica~ion, 
as the card might be lost or stolen. A user of the card also 
has to enter an identifying word or number in order to use 
the 'card. 
The strengths of a token are ·its two-tiered security, 
since an ID number and card must be used together, and it~ 
general acceptance by the public, through the large-scale 
Automated Teller Machine (ATM) implementation in'use today . 
The weakneaaea.ot a token are ~hat it must be carried 
' ' ,• 
with the user to acce3s the system. The person ~ay forget· the 
token, or leave it in their oth~r ja~k~t. They may lose the 
tcken. They may feel the token is intrusive on their daily 
routine it' it mu~t be used often during the day. 
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.C. Dia~-back devices 
The most vulnerable link in a network is a dial-up 
line. This is the first point of access in a network, and 
available for challenge by.anyone with a modem and· a telephone 
line. User authentication is difficult enough in a single 
computing system; bu~ it becomes far more difficult when users 
can dial.in from a telephone, literally anywhere in the world. 
~he Lineguard 3060 port protection device by Weste~n 
' 
Dataserve. can protect up to 60 telecommunication ports, and 
has a built-in audit trail capability (Young, 1986). Dial-
back devices· such as th~s combine "what you know" with "what 
you possess". A user wishing to access a system thro".lgh 
remote telephone lines 'i• required to call from a designated 
phone nUmber. Th~ computer system being called wil~ get from 
the user an ID number, and then hang up the phone. It will 
then search an internal database to determine if the user is 
authorized access. If so, it will call the user back at the 
d3signated ph~ne number, and access can ensue. 
Although this incurs a time delay for the user, it is 
' I ' t I 
~likely to·overahadow the convenience ot remote acc..,sa, most 
. . 
like~y from home. The problem arises when the user needs or 
wants· to access. the system from another numbor not on. the 
approved list. Once the user gets used to having this type of 
access, he may become incHgnant wh~n he cannot . 
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Diskless workstations are a relatively new phenomenon. 
They are similar to the standard mainframe terminal that many 
are familiar with, but have the added local processing power 
of a modern personal computer. As their name implies·, though, 
they lack removable disk drives. This allows processing of 
sensi~ive info~ation at ~he workstation, but eliminates the 
possibility of someone transferring that information from the 
workstation by way of removable media (magnetic disks) • 
This device has relatively little impact on the person 
·using it. Projects· that are relegmted to these workstations 
must be able to be completed without transferring data by 
using disks, so there is little or no imposition caused to the 
user by the lack ot disk drives. 
D. BIOICII:'l'IUC ACCKSS CON'l'JlOLS 
Some devices are now available that can recognize physical 
· · chara~teristics 0~ people, such as ~ingerprints, 
· pronunciation, and patterns o~ the retina. o~ the eyes. These 
devices pr.ovide highly reli&ble assurance o~ authenticity. 
' ' ' 
!'urthe~ore, ~ingerprints or pronunciation cannot be lost or 
stolen; they are not inconvenient to carry around, they do not 
have to b• kept ~ecret, ·and they are virtually. impossible to 
There i~, however, a learning curve for these biometric 






false rejection rate is higher than the ut=~er might have 
experienced with authentication devices already discussed. As 
a user becomes more familiar with a biometric verifier, 
though, his ~alse rejection rate decreases (Sandia, 1990). 
1 . Signature Veri:tier 
Autosig Sys~ems of Irving, Texas manufactures the 
Sign/On signature dynamics verifier. This device incorporates 
a user interface tablet which integrates' into a host access 
system. .The user signs his name on the tablet, and this 
signature· is compared with a system· eopy of the signature. 
Variabl(ls such as pencil pressure and writins speed 'are 
considered. If the match is' close enough, access is granted 
to the sys~em. The false reject rate ot such a devico, for a 
trained user, is about 2t. (Sandia, 1990) 
Problems relating t-o· user acceptance of signature 
verification systems include a lengthy enrollment process. 
The user is required to sign his name at least 10 times to 
allow the system to create a composite "authorized signature". 
Faise rejects can.b•come more common,it the user attempts to 
' . ' 
sign-in rapidly, rather than slowly. This perception ot delay 
retards user acceptanc~ o~ the device. 
2 •. btiDal ScaDner• 
A retinal ocanner is. a device i"'to which the user 
looks through a small aperture. Th~ r~tina of the user's eye 
is scanned, and acces~ is granted based on· the pattern ot 






c:> be at least as unique as fingerprints, thus they have a 
~ood ba;;is for a security access cont.rol. EyeDentify Inc., of 
.P\>rtland, Oregon manufactures a retinal scanner •tsing the 
latest tectmological advances. 
There is widespread publi.c. belief, however, that these 
devices contain laser beams, or are otherwise harmful to.the 
eye (SCAT '90, 1989). Additionally, the device is somewhat 
invasive. The user must usually bend to the device, and then 
put his eye right on it. The only similar experience he might 
have had is an eye examination by a doctor. A large 
administrative effort is ust:ally necessary to gain user 
acceptance among technically unsophisticated users. 
3. ringerprint scanner• 
rhese devices require the placement of ~ finger on an 
optical pad. The fingerprint is then scanned for such 
features as print depth and pattern mat.:::hing. Scans that 
relate highly enough with the stored pattern in the system 
' ' 
erate acceptance. Fingerprint scanners, such as those made 
Inc., o'f Sunnyvale, Califor·· ia, averag~ about 6 
onds for the process, but th~y have a 'false reject rate of 
~oximately '10%. This is high fo~ biometric devices, and· 





Enforceme~t Agen~y report, when hands are cold, or the 
is aged, the scanners tend.t~ h~ve higher false ~ejects 
'f , 90, 1989) . 
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A fingerprint scanner is also subconsciously rejected 
by , a user through association with criminal activity. 
Currently, the only other agencies that require fingerprints 
are of the cri1ne enforcement variety. One hardly expects to 
be fingerprinted at work on a regular basis. 
4 . Voiceprint 
Alpha Microsystems of Santa Ana, California 
manufactures a speech verification system called the Ver-A-
Tol. This is a device utilizing technology whereby the sound 
of a spoken word or phrase is digitized, so 'that the computer 
system'can store it, and compare it with later patterns of the 
same word or phrase. Verification takes only about. five 
seconds, and the false reject ra·t::e. is about five percent. 
This is gene~ally acceptable for biometrics. 
The en.rollment ·process for a v~iceprint system is 
tedious and lengthy, consisting of repeating the same word or 
phrase until the system grants a high recognition value to, it . 
. This method of authentication is well-accepted by users (SCAT 
'90,' 1989'). It requires the user' to do nothing but speak, and 
giv.es him a feeling of "mastery" over the system .. The system 
that responds to voice input also encourages the user to think 
of it'as more than a machine . 
.5. •and. GeOIHtry 
A hand qeometry verification device is similar to the 
fingerprint authenticator, but t;.he whole hand is placed on the 






works to decrease the false reject rate to . 2%. Such a device 
is manufactured by Recognition Systems Inc., of San Jose, 
California. This is a highly reliable· security device, and 
well-accepted by the user (SCAT '90, 1989). 
The process of putting the user's. hand down on a pad 
is somewhat akin to shaking hands with a stranger, a commonly 
~ccepted practice in our culture. Processing time is quick, 
as little as three seconds. These two factors contribute to 
few problems in getting people to accept this type of device. 
B. SUIDIARY 
This chapter described the types o~ dam~qe that c~n occur 
to network data, and many of the authentication devices. that 
can be used to e~iminate or reduce the possibility of damage. 
In gen~ral, the devices discussed are all well suited to 
maintaining a' secure· syslam, but they vary greatly in user 
accept~ility. Devices such as passwords must be monitored to 
ensure that certain ones are· not used. Other devices, like 
tokens .and retinal scanners have other attributes which 
-discourage user compliance with security procedures. This 
chapter introduced the user acceptance or non-acceptanc~ of 
these devices,. later chapter~ will discuss methods for 






IV. NB'l'WORK SJ:c:t:nu:ft PROCBDORJ:S 
~. IN'rllODOC'l'IOH 
Security managers and information systems managers must 
think of the availability of company resources as not in one 
fixed location, but removed by tremendous distances. Managers 
may not know where to install security systems, because they 
often do not know where all the terminals are. Organization-
wide procedures must be establish~d to provide standards for 
security throughout the system, sine~ it is .impossible for 
security staff to m~nitor each terminal or storage facility at 
all times. 
Thie chapter discusses procedures, as distinct from 
devices, that can increase the security of a network. 
Procedures are organizational proqrams or methods that enhance 
the effectiveness of s~curity devices already in place. They 
can also be security measures ·in and of themselves, without 
affectinq any security devices. 
!'or example, whenever an employee leaves an organization, 
an exit· interview should be held. Aside from the m~naqftrial. 
benefits of such an interview, it. is an ideal time to collect 
security badges, keys, arid any oth'!r. s·eeurity access devices 
from the employee. This time c!'.n a!i.r'so be used to initiate 
paperwork .necessary 'to remove the user's passwords from the 








This is an example of a security 
1. Paaaword aaaociated procedurea 
Research continues on even more sophisticated methods 
of authentication, but password mechanisms remain the dominant 
method of identifying computer system users. This is true for 
cost reasons a3 well as ease of use and user acceptance. The 
Internet worm of November, 1988, incorporated a password 
guessing ro,ltine (Oldehoeft, 199~). The guesses were 
comprised of:· the null password, the username, the username 
appended· to itself, the nickname, the last name of the user, 
and the last n~e spelled backwards. This guessing system 
typically broke 30% of the passwords in a system. In about 5% 
of cas~s, the default manufacturer password to a ~ystem was 
still active, often allowing s1•stem manager privileges (Stoll, 
1989) . 
, Iowa State University wrote a password guesser which was 
able to gue,s . 15%· of. its systems pasf!!!_orc1s_ in 3 days 
(Oldehoeft, 1990) . This was due to poor password choices, 
such as "uuep" to~ various Uucp networking'logins. There are 
several procedures to focus ~he selection of passwords toward 
more secure choices than is normally the case. 
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a. Paa.-phra••• 
The use of passooophrases instead of passwords can 
greatl¥ increase the difficulty of conducting a brute force 
attack. A four word phrase consisting of words ,from a 25,000 
word di~tionary yields 3. ~x 1017 combinations. One must be 
careful about enforcing too long of a pasa-~hrase length, 
however, lest users become irritated by keying errors. These 
phrases should also be cheeked by. a gue~ser program for 
triviality, such as phrases like "Mary had .-~ little lamb". 
Paasword ageing is the enforcement of a maximum . 
password lifetime. This is a procedure that can be U4ed ,in 
conjunction with password selection proeedqres. It 
automa~~cally gets users to change their passwords at some 
predetermined time interval. Although a good technique to 
decrease the vulnerability period of a password, 'it has 
possible aide effects. If the lifetime , is short, the 
. . 
technique may be counterp~oduetive, resulting in user 
frustration at having to ch.ange passwords too often. If there 
is no warning mechanism to tell the user that passwords·will 
~oon expize, they may be caught unaware by the demand. This 
·could result in a poor password choice. 
To combat this last consequence,. minimum lifet.1mes 
sh?uldbe used to prevent users from changing password$ bae~. 
to "easy" ones that. they may prefer. For example, a user 










the appropriate time, then immediately change it back. This 
meets the system requirements for changing, b"'Xx defea·ts the 
purpose of the procedure. 
c. P•••word generation 
A speaker on security methods often checked the 
inside of the hats of audience members prior to a lecture. He 
usually found pieces of paper with passwo·rda li:::-itten down, and 
used them in his lecture (Klopp, 1990). 
It is far easier to maintain control over password 
selection in a system wher.ein passwords are machine generated 
and assigned to users, than one in which users may select 
their own passwords. However, as this.story shows, there is 
a greater risk of password co:.\!)romise in systems in which the 
user is not free to select his own password. In this 
instance, if the. password ·is not one which the user can 
remember easily, he may write it down. 
Password generation is a procedure in which a 
computer program is developed to create strings t . .., be used as 
passwords . These s_trings are not gen··.!.ne words such as may 
be · found . in a dictionary, rather they are · strings of · 
concatenated syllable .components, joined so t~at they are 
easily pronouncellble, and thus mor.e memorable than a random 
sequence of letters. 
One ·method of ·creating s•.1ch passwords . is to have 





with rules to govern their concatenation so that the resulting 
"word" is pronounceab~e. 
d. Paaaword aonitor 
This is a procedure whereby a ~omputer is allowed 
to "grade" a 'user's choice for a password. This is . 
accomplished by comparing the password with the database of a 
password guesser. A password guesser is a program that can 
conduct an exhaustive attack upon a system. Sources for an 
exhaustive attack on passwords are a large commercial 
dictionary, the reverse spelling of the words in the 
dictionary, a list of first names, last names, street names, 
and cities, all of the above with the ~irst · letter in 
capitals, valid license plate numbers, and the like. In a 
collection of 3289 passwords, 86' were found in one of the 
above sources o~ password guesses (Wood, 1990) . 
2. Auditing 
Auditing o~ network activity is a proced~re that can 
y;ield great benefits in security. Cur:=-ently, much data about 
network activity is co1le.cted automatically. by the network 
software, but it takes ·human intervention to act upon this 
data. 
!'or. example, th• so~tw~re may capture in~ormation 
associated with login attempts. It caft· store successful login 
I , I ' 
and logout information, unsuccessful attempts, successful and 
unsuccessful password changes, and the proqrams or data areas 






This informa.tion is useful only if reviewed and 
interpreted by security personnel. Programs can be developed 
to alert system operators to potential problems, but in the 
end, it takes a human being to eval~ate and solve a security 
issue. 
Auditing require~ that controls generate sufficient 
evidence to show that they have been operating correctly. The 
evidence. may take the. form of logs, audit trails, reports, 
blinking lights, or other forms of obvious or hidden feedback. 
One of the most conspicuous examples involves password-based 
access control syste~s. These .. systems can generate voluminous 
logs showing when users logged-in, when they logged-out, the 
programs they ran, and the requests for access they submitted 
(whether approved or denied). 
Without: evidence that a control is operating properly, 
management cannot· be confident that ,the control is in fact 
dl!"'ing the job it is intended to do. Without such evidence, 
manage~ent is unable to make adjustments so that the control 
does its job better. Auditability is therefore .an essential 
part of day-to-day management, not something just for 
auditors. 
A more proactive view towards auditability involves 
what is called · instrumentation. Thi's refers· to specific · 
lights or other feedback that a ccnt:r·~·l prov~des, such that if 
it fail!~ or is being attacked, those responsible for the 




notifies the operator if someone is trying to guess passwords 
(Wood, 1990) . The notification allows those respons,ible to 
take corrective or def~nsive actions promptly . 
. 3. Concept o~ "Lea•t priv~lige" 
In the Department of Defense, this concept is 
identified as "need to know". It indicates that access to 
information, the ability to execute certain programs, and 
other system privileges should be restricted to those who can 
demonstrate, a business or mission-related need. Modern system 
integrity theory applies this concept to data, programs, and 
users by ·allowing only certain programs to access certain 
data; integrity of the processes supported by programs .is 
preserved by allowing only designated users to affect the 
.Processes. 
A drawback of the "least privilege" concept is that it 
employees do not know what others are doing or how they are 
doing it, there is little opportunity for suggestions to cross 
organizational boundaries and improve operations. · The concept 
can also make a worke~s' job boring or less producti~ than it 
might be. . If users- are unable to query the system for· data 
' they think could be related to their work, impatience and a 
feeling of f~stration are probable. 
4. In~deftce ~~ control and •ubject 
This procedure dictates that the person charged with 
des~gn, implemention, and/or operation of a ·control should no.t 






example, a programmer who is charged with writiug a password 
authentication program for a certain system, should not 
subsequently become an authorized user of that same system. 
The potential for wrongdoing is great, since the progr.~e~ 
ktotlWS exactly how the authentication program works, and r:tay. in 
fact have built in a s.-ecret "entrance" to the program • 
5. Separation o~ dutiee 
This procedure prohibits organizational structures 
that involve conflicting loyalties o~ goals between or withir. 
departments. For example, having the Security function be a 
part of the Auditing Dep~rtment would be unwise, because the 
Auditing department would then be unable to perform an 
unbiased review of Security. 
This procedure can also be applied to individuals and 
project teams. Members of programming teams !!hould not become 
authorized users on the system for which they are developing 
programs. Tl.is could lead tt'\ a pos~ible compromise· o~ the 
system at a later time. Thsre is no known way to prevent the 
· determined systems 'hacker ~rom vi.olating computer-based access 
controls i~ he is allowed to write proc;rams (Browne, 1990). 
6. Oniv•r••l application 
This is the consistent and all-embracing usage of a 
cont.c.ol measure across the . spectrum of environm@tnts, 
.computers, or people to be controll~d. 
rule'weaken controls. 
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Exceptions to this 
For example, top management may be exempt from a 
requirement to wear a badge when ~n the computer room. By 
virtue of this exemption, an interloper may enter: the computer 
center, and having no badge., the staff may stay out of· his 
way, regardin9 him as a new member of the top management team. 
As another example, if only visitors are ~equired to 
wear bad9es, a ·curious visitor who wanted to take a look 
around could easily masquerade as an employee simply by 
reUloving his badge. If badges must 'be worn by every person in 
a.controlled area, the status of visitors and others in need' 
of escorts or special treatment can easily be deter.mined and 
consistently enforced. 
7. De~eoa~?e.deptb 
This is a procedure that increases security ·by 
providing multiple, overlapping controls. A physical analogy 
is a facility where a fence is used in conjunction with motion· 
detectors and other physical access dontrols. If one of these 
controls is compromised or circ~ented, the other controls 
pr.ovide a safety pet to ~nsure that, in · overa,ll terms, a 
penetration is not successful. 
Defensive depth is also found in the redundant use of 
a single control measure. This approach on a; computer system 
would take the form of several layers of password~ ·being 
required on a network. 'For instan-:9. a fix:st password might 




to gain access to a remote host;· and a third, to get special 
privileges on the destination computer. 
Defensive depth is a concept that implies controls 
placed in parallel rather than in series. Although both 
facilities in Figure 1 have two doors, the first configuration 




rigure 1. Defensive Depth. 
In the first, ~intruder needs only get through,one 
door. ·In the next' configuration,. though, it is required to 
pass through two doors to gain, access ·to the computer room·. · 
The use of doors in the figure i~ ~erely illust~ative, any 
security devic~ .could be used. 
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It is not necessary, nor is it desired, to limit 
access control to the periphery of a single large area. A 
space may be .divided into smaller component areas. This 
permits limiting access for individuals to the areas which 
their job r~quires, and no othors. Separate access controls 
may be applied to each of the .areab that are components of the 
larger co~puting facility. 
8. Leaat c~n -cbaniaa 
This principle seeks t;.o minimize reliance on a central 
system component that may become unavailable. A physical 
analogy (Figure 2), shows that with a LAN built in the star 
configuration, failure of the central node will mean the 
network is unavailable to any node . 
.. 
. b. 
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Failure of any one node on a LAN with a ring 
configuration, though, will not render the LAN unavailable, as 
traffic can be sent the other way around the ring. 
The least common mechanism principle implies that the 
effectiveness of controls should riot, to the greatest extent 
possible, depenc:f on the prope::-. operation .of other controls. 
For example, if an organization uses automatically generated 
terminal passwords, but no user-IDs or··system acceas 
passwords, it is impli~itly relying on p~ysical measures to 
control who may gain access to a computer. If this measure is 
compromised, no security exists. A more secure way to design 
this system would be to have two separate and independent 
procedures, one for controlling physical access, and one for 
controlling. computer access. 
9. De:fault to denial 
When a 'control fails, ·which .failure should be 
·anticipated in any design, the control should deny &¢cess to 
users and other entities requesting service. For 
' . ' 
stance, 
the failure of .~n authenti~ation device in a should 
default the system to reject &-!ly attempts at user access, 
rather than allowing all attempts at access to be granted 
witho~t authentication .. This procedure prevents the devices 
from · t.eing disabled purposely in ord~r to bypas them. 
Oe$igners should appreciate that it is easier to turn a 
. ' 






10. Dial-up ace••• 
A good procedure to follow in the use of ·dia!-up 
access lines is to route all dial-in users to a private branch 
exchange operator. This operator screens calls and asks 
identifying information of the caller. If the person is an 
authorized user, tha operator switches the call onto one of 
the dial-up ports. No dial-up ports can be dialed directly. 
while this is better than many totally automated systems, it 
still depends upon human factors, which are subject to the 
.quality of the person working the PBX at the time.' 
C. IUSK AHALYS·IS PllOC&DORBS 
Risk analysis is part of the creation and improvement of 
any effective security system. There are several ways to 
conduct risk analysis, however, and management should be aware 
of the different methods' strengths and weaknesses. Typical 
risk analysis procedu,res follow,, with discussion of their 
stron~ and weak areas. 
1. Cbeckliata 
This is the traditional way to att;.empt control of 
risks. It is easy·, and: formalized. Its primary disadvantage 
is size'. A comprehensive checklist for a moderately-sized 
information system can be several hundred pages (Shaw, 1988)". 
·Checklists may cover virtually all p-,ssible seeurity problem 
areas, but they are rarely "system specific", and thus cannot 
cover every area for any par~icular system. 
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Neither do checklists provide any of the information 
necessary to make, decisions . They . are however, a good 
starting'point for an analysis of a system, providing pointers 
to areas of potential trouble, and inducing in management a 
se~urity mindset. 
2. Quant.~t.at.i'V'e riak evaluation 
This procedure evalu~tes security :i.n term~ of cost of 
controls versus cost. of information loss. It is the only 
practical means of evaluating the cost effectiveness of 
maintaining, impro.ving, 
controls and procedures. 
or reducing necessary security 
A quantitative approach provides 
management with a ~eans to evaluate the security p~oposal in 
a manner that they understand, which is dol~ars. 
A problems with this approach, though, it that it 
tt: .1ds to create the appearance , of accuracy d~e to the use of 
concrete numbers. Action based on the assumption of good data 
is often dysfunctional to the organization~ 
understand that these numbers are. only 
estimates of the value of information. 
3. Scenario-baaed ~ethod 
Management ~ust 
as good as the 
This procedure. is based on a scenario-oriented 
analysis of possible risk factors . Scenarios are developed of 
potential damaging incidents, such as loss of CP'V 
availability, and the eost associ~ted with th~ loss is 
estimated. This type of analysis is normally carried out by 
both the systems' users and risk m~nagement experts. Its 
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chief problen,t is that it. contains forms and questions which 
require extensive investigations and the use· of experts. 
These investigations may .be impossible for an organization to 
conduct, or the experts · needed may not be available. A 
positive effectof this procedure is that it gets the users 
involved and emphasizes the importance of risk control. 
4. Qualitative riak analyaia 
This method assimilatee the qualitat'ive evaluations of 
the security. manager in an attempt to come to a general 
conclusion about the systems' security. Its primary 
usefulness is in identifying problem areas. As with the 
scenario-based method, it requires an expert evaluation, which 
may not be available. It is not well-suited for developing 
solutions to the problem areas identified. 
D • StJIGIARX 
Network security procedures can enhance the effectiveness 
of security devices, or stand alone as secu~ity el~ents in 
and of themselves. Standard organizational security 
procedures can greatly improve the security of an information 
' . . 
network. 
Procedures s,uch .as password agf'-ing, auditing, and 
· separation of duties can all decrease the . security risks 
associated with a system. Fr.oce-:tures, though, are as 
dependant as devices upon the proper attitude and actions of 
the human operator. Auditing, for example, is merely the 
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gathering of useless information, if a person does not take 
the time to review and act on the information gathered. If a. 
defensive depth procedure is seen as unnecessary, or too time-
consuming, it may be cir.cumvented. Human factors are the 
final arbiter of a procedure's effectiveness. 
Risk analysis of networks involves on or more procedures 
to determine the need for controls, or the effectiveness of 
current controls. 'l'he usefulness of the~.e procedures also are 
dependent upon the quality 'of the people involv~d, and the 
actions taken after the analysis is complete. 
'l'he security procedures reviewed in this chapter show how 
organizational actions can have a positive effect on the 
security of a network. It als,o shows t4at this positive 
effect can be undermined if human factors are ignored or 
undervalued. 'l'he next chapters discuss various methods of 
increasing user motivation to follow correctly the security 




s.ecurity controls are a vital part . of any information 
network. They are needed to protect data and programs from 
unauthorized 'modifications or disclosure. The controls can be 
as simple as a password authentication system, or as complex 
as multi-level, multi .. token access control. Any method of 
control, however, affects the user. If controls are not 
acceptable to users, or to others who are affected by such 
controls, ways will invariably be found to overcome or ignore 
them. 
Basically, people resent controls. Whether it is safety 
belts in an automobile, or time limits on CPO usage, people 
dislike being subjected to mechanical restraints. Left to 
their own devices, ·people often circumvent or disable control 
mechanisms. Control mec anis~s are also useless ~less people 
pay attention to them. 
A discussion of met to motivate users toward security 
consciousness and se rity•oriented behavior must first 
identify the positive d negative human factors that affect 
security. Chapter III 
factors. 
This chapter 
scussed how certain security devices 
lar attitudes toward these human 
same for security procedures. 





order to allow later development of methods to promote the 
positive factors and diul.inish the negative ones. It also 
introduces a chart depicting the relative importance of the 
presence or absence of specific human factors as applied to 
specific network security controls . 
B. DBMO'.riV1'1IHQ rAC'IORS 
1. Security control forced upon u••r 
The interpersonal communications needed to gain user 
support for security controls are often forgotten in the 
effort to create a security control system, or patch up an 
inadequate existing 2tystem. Management often treats the 
involved people as though they are just another part of the 
system, without feelings, concerns, and other ~iquely human 
attributes requiring special consideration. 
An 'example of . this factor in action is when a user 
password is,chosen by the system administrato~, with no input 
or involvement from the user himself. This type of policy may 
well be the most efficient security measure, en~ling the 
administrator· to, easily cont~ol passwords and limit· access .. , 
Excluding the user from the process, though, can negate any 
benefits. 
Time must be invested to qain acceptance from the 
people involved, to train those same people, and obtain their 
cooperation and support. To do otherwise, management invites 
sabotage, work slowdowns, and other rebellious responses. 
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2. Control tuea a long tiae to perform 
Consideration of the performance impact on both 
involved humans and involved computers is an impoJ;tant element 
of attaining the acceptance of subjects of security control. 
If there is an adverse performance impact, and user.a are given 
no dispensation for the changed circumstance, acceptance will 
·be moat difficult to obtain. 
For example, if data entry personnel get paid based on 
the number of transactions they enter, and if management 
introduces a control that slows their data entry work, the 
staff would be likely to object~ unless there was a 
.corresponding adjustment in the pay rate. 
Security procedures in depth also tend to demotivate 
users, particularly if the ratio of time spent on the controls 
relative to time spent in work is high. For example, a user 
who must pass through multiple security controls each. time he 
enters a secure application, may spend more time passing 
through the contro~s than doing the work. · T~is user will be 
inclined to work less on. the applicat~on than may be 
· necessary, perhaps falsifying records indicating that data has 
been checked.or updated. 
3. Control interfere• with uaer'a routine 
Security controls that interrupt a person's daily work 
routine, or cause that rou~ine to b~ altered, will be met with 







normal work routines are default to denial systems, overuse of 
token systems, and certain dial-back mechanisms. 
Default to denial schemes are controls that, when 
d~s~led or absent, result in denial of resources to the 
requesting user. This can annoy users if, for instance, a 
malfunctioning security ·system resorts to tersely denying 
entry rath"!r than. explaining the reason to the user. A simple 
message stating that the control is'inoperative, thus access 
cannot be granted, would allow the user ~o seek help from the 
system administrator rather than be frustrated by a cryptic 
denial. 
Excessive use of tokens in a. security contro!. syst'7m 
can also greatly irritate and discourage users. At a 
well-known computer manufacturer's facility in Italy, a 
magnetic card-based physical access control system was 
installed on nearly every door in the data center. Every time 
employees went into the hall, the washroom, the lunchroom, or 
other areas, they were forced, to insert their card into a' wall 
reader. The effort and inconvenience this procedure c~used 
resulted ~n the workers going on strike. Such a reaction may 
have been avoided if the use of the cards had been res~rved 
for true security purposes, rather than as a control on every 
door. (Wood, 1990) 
Dial-back systems can interfere with work habit~ 
well. In particular, systems that allow for only one 
authorized number per user. In thls case, a user· is 
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restricted physically to one location in order to use a 
computer phone line. If work or convenience compels the user 
to be at a different phone number than the one held by the 
·system, then the user's motivation to work will decline. 
4 . control ia invaai ve 
The previous example of the Italian firm that required 
card insertion at every door in the workplace was also 
perceived by the employees as an unwarranted invasion of their 
privacy (Wbod, 1990). Employees are justifiably bothered by· 
what' seems to be management's attempt to track their every 
move. 
Another aspect of securi.ty control that does not sit 
well with many employees, particularly pro~essionals, is the 
f.act thz.t &n organization's in~ ormation does not belong to the 
employee, even though the employee may have produced it. 
Bmpl.oyees are r~luctant to treat an organizatiol'l' s informatio~ 
holdi~g~ as ass'ets that should be protected. This attitude is 
reflected ·in inc.idents o~ reported employee indi~ference to 
the ~amaqe created by s~me 'computer viruses, and by the 
appar.nt resurgence o~ business. espionage (Wood; 1990). 
This unwillingness to protect an organization's 
. comput•rized information assets seems to be heiyhtened by an 
idea propounded by.some microeomputer.networkin~ enthusiasts. 
These people contend tha.t e'·'!r:)•c-n~ who works for an 
organization should have unlimited a~cess to a~l the 




supposed to improve job performance. However, it is more 
likely to lead to increased f1:iction between individual 
employees, as well as between some employees and the 
. orginization's management. (Menkus, 1990) 
Americans typically contend that ~osing any form of 
control over the way in which they spend their working time is . 
repressive, and an invasion of their personal privacy (Shain, 
1989) . They may feel that such control interferes with their 
prerogatives as self-motivating professionals. 
s. 
No, security system, no ~tter how technically 
efficient, can succeed without the support o~ the management 
in the organizat.ion. If the users of a network see that 
m~agement is not concerned with the security aspects of the 
information system, neither will they be. 
Security-or.iented behavior needs to }?e recognized as 
an important part · job performance. The lack o~ this aspect of 
the job in most organizations per~ormance evaluations 
,contributes to the notion that manager·nt does not view the 
area of security as important. 
, ·The principle o~· universal application, as discussed 
earlier, also bears on the question 0~ manl!lgement ,commitment 
' ' 
. to security. .I~ management exempts itsel~ ~rom controls to 
which other employees must submit, th~n the organization is 
sending the message that security is only a minor issue, and 
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not important enough to require the support of every member of 
the organization. 
c. IIO'l':IU!'ntG rAC'fOu 
1. control. pz:oc••• 
In any security system, it is important to involve the 
subjects of the contro.ls in the process of developing ~d 
implementing those controls . Thi~ does not mean that controls 
should be subject to user approval prior to implementation, 
only that involvement in the process is vital . to ·user 
acceptance. 
This invol~ent should start upon the hiring of new 
empioyees, with an interview in which organizational security 
policies are defined, · and the reasons behind the policies 
· explained.' It must carry on t~ th• implementation of security· 
controls, as in the use of a password assistance program, 
which can offer choi~es of computer-generated passwords. This 
way the security manager maintains control over the choice of 
passwords, yet the user is 3ble to participate .in. the process. 
and. feel a sense of freedom of choice. 
Mhen changes are planned for ~ system, the changes 
aust be discussed with the user~, or th• users must at least· 
·be informed that the changes are coming, and their purpose. i.n 
the system. Changes to ~ syst~l':l that are made without 








User involvement can also be achieved through training 
and education. The sense of interpersonal relationship is 
significantly reduced when dealing with a computer. There is 
a feeling that ethics are for people, not machines. The more 
directly personal a relationship is, the more acute our 
ethical sensitivity becomes. We seldom have the same 
emotional reaction to a computer that asks us to key in an 
~ppropriate response as to a person'who asks us a question. 
If, through education, users. can meet with security 
personnel, see who they are, and learn what their specific 
responsibilities are, ethical standards the users are familiar 
with may seem applicable to the network environment, and thus 
be effectively harnessed for network security. 
2. l»er•ooal re8p0n8ibility · ior control• 
· :Legally, employee• commonly are held to share in asset 
protection responsibility. This ~eneral asset protection 
obligation has been s~pported in the· united States in numerous 
court eases and labor·arbitration hearings. (Menkus, 1990) 
In · mo.st organizations this obligation to protect 
critical information assets is not ••tabliahed as a standard 
condition of employment .. 
responsibility has not 
Thus, for example, 
been delineated. in a 
where that 
structured 
fashion, an organization's professional and technical 
employees'may feel they are fre~ to share unlimit~d amounts of 
sensitive, and even proprietary information with others in 
their particular profession. 
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Responsibility must be placed squarely on the us~r's 
shoulders t~·ough explicit instruction and written cont~act. 
Informing a user that his password identifies any ~ctions ou 
the network as his own, unauthorized actions included, will 
serve to promote proper safeguarding of passwords. People 
will be less likely to share or write doWn their passwords if 
they kn~w that they will be held respons~ble for all network 
sessions using tnat password. 
Responsibility for security is a ,rule that must be 
highly publi~ized and ~own to be strictly enforced. Swift 
and appropriate punishme.&t for security·breaches will motivate 
users to be· mo1:e security consci~~s.. If a person knows that 
failing to follow proper procedure may result in the loss of 
clearance or even his job, compliance will increase. An 
atmosphere in which punishment.is rare or insufficient will do 
little to promote security-minded behavior~ 
3. Reward uaera ~or good 8ecurity practice• 
The counterpart to sw.ift and just punishment for 
security infractions is a syst~ for rewarding those who show 
good security practices. Already mentioned was the inclusion 
o~ security behavior in the performance evaluation, but other 
types of reward'systems ccn also be efteetive. 
Normal~y monotonous tasks, such as checking audit 
logs, can be seen differently if an ~·Jditor know·-" that he wili 
be rewarded for finding dis :repanei~s. Just as punishment 





rewards provide an added incentive to maintain good security 
practices and detect poor ones.· 
4. Baay,.fAat, ~d accurate control• 
This factor acts as the o~osite to the d~otivating 
factor of difficult, complex, and error-prone controls. If a 
control is easy to use, people will natur~lly be more likely 
to use it. If it does not slow down their normal working 
pace, they will be less likely to avoid it. If it is accurate 
in its execution, it will avoid promoting frustration in the 
user. All these aspects of this fa.:::tor are ·desirable, and 
increase the probability that a user will employ security 
controls. 
5. O••r• are c~ortable with control• 
This factor alludes to the mer.tion in Chapter 3 of 
certain controls with which users are instinctively 
comfortable. Specific'ally, controls like ·signature 
ver~fication and Personal Identification Numbers. 
Using a signature for authentication is an action that. 
has been around · in our soci.ety for hundreds of ·.years; the 
applicati'on of that act to computer networks is an easy 
transition. Personal Ide?tification Numbers, though not as 
historically ingrained, have enjoyed widespread acceptance for 
many years in the .form 'of ATM · auth'!!ntication. Again,· the 
·transition to information syst'!!ms us~ is an easy one, 
Incorporating into controls 1deas and actions that are 





change that always exists, and take advantage ·?f secure 
methods of control toward which users are already favorarly 
disposed. 
6 . Management a\spport o~ aecurity control• 
This factor has been mentioned several times already 
in various contexts. It is an integral part of any successful 
security system, thus it has bearing on many different facets 
of the system. Without management support, the org'anization 
as a whole will neglect security as an effort not worth 
taking. Visible, constant, and unquestioned . support of 
security goals must be management'~ contribution to the 
security of a network information system. Such support will 
act to create similar attitudes throughout the organization, 
and foster a sense of "corporate awareness" of security 
issues. Once this attitude becomes firmly ingrained in the 
organization, it will be~ome ~~ institutionalized attitude, 
extremely difficult to change, and the source of peer pressure 
in support of security.goals. 
D. BtJMAN I'ACTORS IN Sl»BCII'XC SJJ:etnU:TY CONftOLS 
Developing a methodology for incorpor;.ting, puman factors 
into security controls .·requires first that each factor's 
effect. on the different controls is quantified. To implement 
a control, some idea of the relath•'! impact that a particular 




is an attempt to quantify the relative effect of the human 
fa~tors previously discussed. 
Eyery security control creates a feeling in each 
individual.user, either of acceptance or rejection, merely 
from the method of control itself. For ·instance, voice 
recognition systems give power to the user over the machine; 
his spoken "command" results in the machine's compliance. A 
dial-back system·, however, requires the user to conform to the 
system's desires; he. must be at the phone number the machine 
recognizes. These inherent characteristics of the security 
control are impossible to c~ange, but an enlightened security 
administrator can bring to the control the human factors that 
aid in user acceptance, and try to remove from the control 
those factors that block acceptance. 
B. SECURITY OPTrMIZATIO" 
Figure 1 is a chart showing the relative importance of 
specific human factors as applied to spec:ific securit·y 
controls. The values at the intersect~on of a factor and a 
cont~ol indicate how strong the interaction is between a 
specific factor and a specific control. A "+" sign denotes a 
favorable. interaction, a "-" sign, ·an unfavorable interaction. 
The values range fr,om +5 to -s, with· a .. __ .. indicating no 
interaction. 
To interpret the chart; use the intersection of Passwords 
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if a passw<>rd system is implemented with the support . of 
management, and if the support is conveyed to users, the 
$ystem will be accepted and supported by those users. A value 
greater than +2 would indicate a higher degree of acceptance 
and utilization. A value less than zero would indicated a 
poor degree of acceptance and possible attempts to bypass the· 
control. 
An example of the unfavorable situation is the value at 
the intersection of Passwords and Lengthy Control, -3. This 
shows that if the passwo~d is too long, the effect on'the user 
will be negative, and the magnitude of the value indicates 
that this may have relatively serious consequences on 
security. The user will be likely to write down the password, 
or even create a "logon script" to bypass entering the 
password di·rectly. 
1. Uaing the opt~&ation grid 
When a manager can interpret the grid, he can then use 
it as intended, to optimize the security.situation fqr which 
he is responsible. There are 2 ways to user the grid for 
security optimization. 
The first way is. used if the· controls of the 
organization are a given. In this case, the manager can enter 
the grid on the row containing the· contr'Ol used in the 
organization, then go across thg rcow teo fil)d thg highest value 
in that row; The manager should then atte~pt to implement the 
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human factor at the top of that column. This will optimize 
the degree. of security possible for the given control. 
The second way may be used if the human factors in the 
organization are more set than the controls. If the 
organizational environment is such that the security ~anager 
cannot affect them, then he can enter the grid at the top, at 
the factor that exists in the organization. He can then go 
down the column until reaching the highest value in the 
column. The security control in that row will be the one that 
optimizes security, given the human factors in place. 
It is likely that in any organization, neither the 
controls nor the human factors are set in stone. In this 
·case, the security manager can pick and choose the optimum. 
combinations for increased securitJ(. In any case, though, the 
mana~er must first determine what factors in the organization 
he can influence, and how great his influence can be. 
·This chart can be useful in maximizing user acceptance 
of and co~pliance with network security.controls .. It can be 
a guideline when implementing controls, or when improving 
existing control.•. It is important to realize,· though, that 
the values are subjective, and. may need to be adjusted for 
particular organizational cultures or work environments. 
The security optimization grid can roughly be divided 
into 6 areas. Among. t'he. contro,ls, '3 divisions are relevant. 







a· spE::cial ca~e of devices, but deserve added analysis. Among 
the human factors, 2 groups appear, .those that are control-
related, and those that are organization-related. For 
example, forcing users to accept a password, with no input in 
the process, is a function of organizational procedure, not a 
factor .of the password itself . 
D. stnfMu.Y 
This chapter discussed in detail some human factors that 
directly impact the security posture of a network information 
syste~. To ignore these factors in cr6ating or upgrading 
security systems is to invite the users to ignore and 
circumvent· the controls. The users are the heart of any 
information system, and a lack of regard for factors affecting 
them is not good management . It · also introduced a 
quantitat~ve tool to assist in the development and adjustment 
of security controls,· in order to optimize security. A 
discussion of methods of security control that take best 
aqvantage of the human factors discussed, is the subject of 
the next chapter. 
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VX. BHII.I.HCIHG SECURITY CONTROLS : A BOIIAH r.AC'.rORS 
A. IN'l'RODOC'fiOR 
Personnel from within an organization present the greatest 
threat to its security system, yet they can also ·be its 
greatest security control (Parker,· 1990) .. Many employees 
un~erstand their organization's system and work with its data 
on a daily basis. Their relative ease of access to data gives 
them the best opportunity to abuse or manipulate it. Yet, 
this daily interaction alao.gives them the 'best ,perspective 
from which to detect data errors or security breaches. The 
strength of a security p:z;ogram is based largely on security 
awareness and compliance by employees. 
This is the premise o~ this thesis, and this chapter 
combines the previous discussions of human factors and 
security controls into practical'methods to achieve network 
security. 
Many __ se_curity directors step into a job ~d ·inherit the 
existing system, along with all its ~aults. Untortunately, 
there are o~ten more pressing demands on the·director's time 
than to undertake a major chanqe in the security 'system. tt 
. . 
appears that the old adaqe, "if it works, let it alone", is 
accepted where security is concern~d. Unfortunately, the fact 
. ' 
• 
that the~e have been no security breaches detected does not 
indicate that the security system works. 
There are two primary defenses against insider crime. The 
first is to reduce.the opportunity to misbehave un~e~ected. 
The second is to counter the rationalizations peop~e use to 
"justify" their misbehavior. The way to achieve the first 
goal is through improvements in the physical security system 
and organizational security procedures. To achieve the second 
goal, a change in the ethical ~nvironment of the organization 
is needed. This change can be realized through an ethics 
education program, user involvement in the system, and user 
training in the standards and procedures expected. 
There are several prerequisites to implementing these 
defenses. An evaluation of the current security system is 
necessary, to identify its weak areas. Support for an 
improved system must be gathered, bo~h from management and 
from the user community. The actual implementation of 
security improvements must be made, and methods for 
maintaining the improved state of se<"·~rity must be put in 
place. 
lis , &VALOA'I'INQ T!il: . COIU\KN'I' SYS'l'B'M 
.An evaluation of the. current state of security in the 
existing network is a necessary step in the process of 
increasing .~Jecurity and building support for the security 
system .. The first' phase of an evaluation ·should· be to 
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determine the existing controls. Often the system has been in 
place so long that the controls in place are not adequately 
inventoried. 
The second phase ~s to determine if the controls are 
adequate for the information being protected. This phase 
should be completed with one of the risk analysis 
methodologies discussed in chapter ~. 
The third phase is then to use a tool suqh as the Security 
Optimization Grid to plan to optimize the controls that are to · 
~emain in place, as well as those that are to be added.· 
Aa an example, assume that a security manager enters. an 
organization after the first two phases have already been 
completed. The existing 'controls of a passw9rd system,. a 
dial-back system, and a universal application stra~eqy are 
consic:iered adequate. Management has. determined, however, that 
a retina scan device is needed to protect a parti~larly 
sensitive area that has been added aince the current secu.rity 
system was developed. 
The question for· the new security mana,g$r is; how ~ight 
the existing controls be improved, and how can the new control 
be introduced so that it achieves maximum effectiveness. An 
evaluation of the situation using the security grid ,will yield 
the answers. 
l'irst, look.at the controls that are to remain in place. 
A password syst~, 
b6nefit~J~ when it· 
according to the grid, yields greatest 




responsibility for the ~assword is maintained. ·A dial-back 
system also works the best when personal responsibility is 
maintained. User involvement is an important human factor, 
but the system. is already in place, so the time· for· user 
involvement in the process is past optimum. A ,trateqy of 
universal application of controls llas its best performance 
under conditions of management support . The controls already 
in place can benefit from the i~lementation of these human 
factors. 
As for the control yet to be implemented, tl:le retina scan, 
the ·security grid shows that speed and .accuracy, personal 
responsibility, and management· supp~rt are most important to 
its success. The Security Optimization Grid is useful in 
assisting security personnel in choosing the human factors 
that maximize the benefits of particular controls. It can 
also aid in selectipg those controls that are most effective 
given a particular human factors environment. 
C. BOILDIHG SOPPCR.'l' I'OR. DIPRO'VJDmH'l' ' 
1'. 
Information is likely one of the critical assets an . 
organ~zation. has, and is probably very poorly ·perceived in 
that regard. Most people do not cons'ider data an asset, and 
the vast majority of laws in exist~nc~ today do not recognize 
data as an asset (Silverman, 1990). 
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But computer criminals have done a service for 
security managers. They have take a subject about which most 
peopl'e know little, and brought it to the pages of Newsweek 
and Tiule. Security officers can use highly publicized 
incidents to help convey the seriousness of the situation to 
top management . Support may thus . be gained for security 
improvements; support that might otherwise be focused on more 
immediate, short-term aspects of the organization. 
With this in mind, a key role of today' s security 
officer is to educate manag~ent. Senior managers 'tend to 
know little about security. and less about computers. They 
frequently assume that computer security is .a technical 
problem calling for. technical solutions. Security officers 
must take an. ~ctive part in resisting this perception, and 
. educate i."pper management to the real 11ature C'f security and· 
control. 
This education has as one o~. its goals, a statement 
detailing management's policy on network security. Such a 
statement is vital so that users will know what the policy is, 
and exactly w~ere management stands on security issues. The 
statement o~ d&ta security policy should address broad 
security issuea. and clearly outline organizational policy. 
Such a·pol~cy should, at the least~ state that;: 
· Data is a valuable asset th~t needs to be protected. 
··P~otection of data assets.is the responsibility of all 
employe&s, not just data processing personnel. 
Only authorized individuals may access the company's 
computer system. 
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Employees are responsible for reporting suspected 
misuse, fraud, embezzlement, or disclosure of 
organizational data or resourcea. 
Security policies need to be clear to all users. 
Management must determine, before a violation occurs, whether 
the organization is willing to prose~ute security violators. 
Making it ·clear. that abusers of the system "ill pay the 
consequences of their actions can serve as a significant 
deterrent to computer crime. One of the greatest reasons for 
not committing a crime is fear of getting caught. Management 
can create a strong disincentive if they make it clear that 
abusers will be ~uniahed. 
The security policy document is the foundation for a good 
security plan. The policy seta the tone for security 
attitudes, and the security plan provides 'for the practical 
implementations of t~at attitude. 
a. S•~ity plan 
·.To overcome management's lack of for 
the importance ~'f in'formation'aecurity activit! Sr it is well 
advised to'· develop a eonvirtcing in-formation s curit'y plan. 
The preparation o'f a plan provides a~ oppo~tunit to talk with 
key high level managers responsible for in-format· or, security·.· 
Additionally, it is through the writing. and revision of 
in'formatio~ security plans that -:-:-,·~~rsati-:-ns the 
information secuz:ity function exists or shou d exist can 
evolve. 
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It is through a plan that conversations abo~t who 
is responsible for information security, how the function 
should be centralized or de<entralized, and the like, can be 
generated. It is through 3. plan that management commitment, 
and buy-in from various other groups, can be obtained. 
The security function cannot wait until 
ci.rcumstances force changes. Instead, i~ must generate, a 
sense o~ urgency about security, and communicate this to 
other~. It can use technical and business knowledge of the 
system to do this. An effective way of communicating ~hat 
must be done, and ita urgency, ia through,an impl~entation 
plan for new'and more ef~~ctive sy~tems control,measur~s. 
Formulation o~ a security plan involves 6 phases. 
(Zviran, 1990) . 
· Identi~y IS assets 
· Aaaess threats and risks 
• Analyze vulnerabilities 
· Evaluat5 existing counterneaaures 
·,Evaluate needed security level 
· Formulate a security plan baaed on identi~ied needs 
These are gener~l guidelines for a security plan, 
but one item that ahoul~ apeci~ical~y be included in the plan 
. are provi.sions for a standards manual. 
In~ormation about computer operations · and computer 
s~curity should be included in the organization's manuals of 
standards. Existing manuals ar~ available that can be used as 
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models for creating a new manual, or eval~ating existing 
standards . 1 
Each employee should receive a manual, and sign a 
statement acknowledging its receipt and agreeing to abide by 
its provisions. Manuals should describe expected security 
procedures and precautions. 
Manuals are important becc:,use they establish . a 
common understanding. A manual seta forth in black and white 
what is allowed, what is expected, and wh~t is against the 
rules. With established organizational standards, rules can 
be ~pplied uniformly to everyone. Well-prepared manl::.ls 
' ' 
address infractions of policy by prescribing appropriate types 
and levels of disciplinary actions. 
It is important to have a security plan. Without 
' ' 
a plan, the in~ormation security ~unction cannot respond 
rapidly to changing circumstances, because ita p~ioritiea are 
unclear. Without an appropriate plan, the communications gap 
between the technical community and management is' likely to 
widen. A plan ensure~ that .both ~roups work together 
eynergiatically. 
However good the plan, though, i~ ~op management is 
not behind it, thr~ugh its policy st~tement and its actions, 
the plan ~ill be ineffective. Security professionals must be 
1 An'excellent manual. to use as a model is available from 
the City of New York, System Security Standards for'Electronic Data 
Processing, Sales ·Manager, Citybooks. City Records Office, 2213 
Municipal .Building, New Yo~k, NY 10007 
73 
able . ·to "sell" ·their plan to the people in charge of the 
organization. 
b. Selling the plan 
To "sell" a security program to management 
requires.: 
· Establishing a need for it. 
· Providing a means to fulfill that need. 
· Ensur~ng that the benefits of m:leting the need outweigh 
the costs of not doing· so. 
· Making sure that people understand the need and the 
benefits of the program. 
One time-tested way to ensure management sees the 
need to address an issue is to frame it in dollars and cents. 
However, ·it is impossible to compute the nur.erical, dollar 
cost of not having security. It is ~lso impossible to compute 
the cost of not hav.ing disaster recovery planning. But it 
becomes crystal clear what those coats are if your security ~s 
penetrated, or if you suffer a disaster, and serve as the lead 
story on page l,of ComputerWorld. Until you suffer a loss, 
though, there is no way to eost-justi'fy security on a purely 
mone'tary basis.' This is the message that ~at be conveyed to 
management. 
Ex_cept · for ·s~curity profession.ala, no. one 
understands all the ramifications of the network security 
problem. The use of examples from oth~r companies about the 
hazards of neglecting security can be useful. Trade·magazines 
often have . stories of security. breaches, although usually 




potentially effective technique. might be to have management 
view the film "War Games", to get their attention. 
Another way to get across the need for security is 
to set up a "tiger team" from people within the organization. 
This team can attempt unauthorized entry into the system. If 
knowledgeable computer personnel are chosen, the odds are good 
that you will have quite a scenario with which to brief 
management. 
The bottom line is, use whatever means are 
necessary to get those in charge to realize the importance of 
security. ·Then the need for security will be established. 
The means. to fulfill the need are contained in the security 
plan, therefore, management now needs to be sold on the 
benefits of the plan. 
Recommendations that increase revenue, without 
incurring additional cost or gene.rating controversy, are sure 
to get priority. Similarly, recommendations that increase the 
output of products and/or services., without increasing costs, 
are always winners. hn·example is a plan for imprQving the 
rat~ of data input through error reduction rather than adding 
operators. Error reduction increases security by making 
systems more resistant to unanticipated actions. 
Re.commendations for reducing operating costs are 
also attractive. Reducing c-::-sts t-y decreasing staffing 
requirements is often appealing. For example, reduce the 
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number of contract security guards by increasing t.he number of 
surveillance cameras. 
Convey to management that the use of an 
information classification system can also produce savings 
because, while it identifies ·valuabl.e information that 
requires protection, it also identifies less important 
information that may be unnecessarily protected by costly 
security..measures., 
Computer security is not cheap. Senior management 
must be sold on the program in order to release the dollars. 
Do not lose sight of the fact that senior management is your 
ul tim~te buyer. But they have to understand what they are 
doin·g before they spend the money. 
Security managers should avoidexcessive technical 
detail in explaining a program. Security ·is a business 
problem, not a technical problem. It can, and should, be 
explained in bu,siness terms, and it can be presented for 
busines~ analys s using traditional business principles of 
efficiency, ove head Feduction, etc. 
Lea e all your technical jargon back at you.r desk 
when elements ,of security. Talk ab9ut transfer 
rate in terms of pages of a report vice baud · rate or· 
megahertz. Tal about error :!:'eduction in terms of increased 
efficiency Of 0 der entry and pr':'C'!SSing. Th<ase are the 
arguments that ll convey to managem'!nt the need for, and the 
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2 . Ooer Support 
a. Bthic• program 
Despite all the good an information ethics 
education can d9, it would have virtually no effect on a true 
criminal (Parker, 1990) . If a person is· going to commit 
fraud; embezzlement, or extortion using informatio~ systems, 
his method may be very dif~erent from the non-automated 
~ariety of criminal, but his ethical values are likely to be 
very similar. His response to an information ethics program 
would probably be no g:reater or less than to any o_ther kind of 
ethics program. 
What · is of more concern .is the far larger 
population of well-intentioned and usually wel~-behaved 
people. Their ethical standards are foggy because of the 
uniqu~ information~related ambiguities ~d conflicts already 
discussed. This· is where a well-structured and executed 
ethics program can bear significant fruit. 
Any successful program o~ in~ormation ethics must 
take the reality of human nature into account. People will 
QOt be models· Of re~traint in CO~unication with no, more 
guidance than a statement of policy _and an occasional 
awareness meeting. Expecting confidentiality to be maint·ained 
with no ethics ·program in place is unrealistic. 
The first principle of ""'hat works· ·and what does 
not in an information ethics program is: Make it speeific_and 
target it· to the audience. Spell 0ut. in specific detail_ what· 
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information is proprietary, the reasons it is proprietary, 
and how it is to be protected. Employees who commit ·computer 
crimes are frequently first offenders who don't think of 
themselves as criminals. When asked about their activities, 
they often fabricat.e legitimate-sounding reasons to justify 
their actions (Zimmerman, 1990). 
An important factor in deterring such crimes is to 
make it abundantly clear that such activity is wrong and 
illegal. This can be done by labeling everything related to 
EDP act · ities with gei,tle remi11ders. All equipment, 
~ocumentl"•.ion, forms, and program headings should c.ontain a 
label tha. states ownership and legal uses. 
An ethics program must be accompanied by local 
recognition and commitment. Unless a user's own management 
and peers actively adopt and support .the program, he will 
regard info~ation ethics as just another effort fr~m 
corporate staff. What is needed is a combination of generic 
' ' 
material and' specific local material with which the user can 
identify, and to which he ~an make a 'personal commitment.· 
One way to bring the program home to the user is 
to identify the people respons~ble for local aspects of 
network security. That part of the emotional reinforcement 
one's conscience receives in a personal relation'ship is 
missing in an elect~onic connecti0n. If the orgariization 
cannot make its information system more personal, it can at 
least clearly identify the people behind th$.system. 
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What makes· information ethics a reality in an 
organization is the force of peer pressure and attention from 
local management. An attitude of security is best transmitted 
by local managers who themselves .have "bought into" the 
program. 
The premise that peer influ~nce plays a primary 
role in creating an ethical environment .is the central ten~t 
of an Air Force security plan called "Keystone" · (Prause, 
1985). There are, 6 steps in the plan. They work together to. 
create, and foster, an environment where security is the norm. 
People being human, they then attempt to emulate the normative 
bebavior of the group, resulting in a secure envirqnm~nt. 
The,steps of the Keystone plan are: 
Proclaim the Guiding Philosophy 
Reach an Informed Consensus 
Publish the Rules 
Know who uses the Computer 
· Investigate Every Deviation 
Establish Due Process Discipline 
In the ambiguous realm of ethics, if a certain 
level of behavior is desired, specific •nd detailed direction 
·is. required. 
b. Syet- invol,...nt 
Enlisting the ~~tive participation of employees in 
planning, designing, a.nd mainta,ining a securit'y system is 
probably the · single most consi:.ruc4:.ive tactic a security 
officer can adopt. The perception that security is an us-. 
v~rsus-them idea must be avoided. A FOSitive attitude is .more 
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likely·to result when employees can participate in security 
system decision-making rather that having to accept rules and' 
regulations ~osed on them by authoritarian mandate. 
Americans have a deep-rooted inclination toward 
complete freedom of choice. Their first reactions to 
controls, restrictions, and procedures are resentment and 
de~iance. This posture is aggravated when rules seem 
arbitrary or capricious. To avoid negative feelings, 
information should be provided about the reasons for security 
ac~ions. In a well-designed security system, every control 
exists for. a reason. The justification for each security 
measure can and should be'· provided to employees. If a control 
cannot be justifi~d, it should not be imposed. 
One way to involve people ~s to give them a stake 
in the success of the system. People do what. they are 
rewarded for doing. One of the strongest motivators for an 
employee is t;.he regular performance evaluation. If employees 
a~e rewarded on their e,valuations for good security practices, 
the program will bene:fit. Secu~it.y-relat~d perfoL-mance should 
be included in the evaluation criteria for employees; its 
l'resence on the evaluation :form w.ill reinforce the perception 
th~t mana9ement is serious about· security .. 
A more direct method of involvement is to solicit 
U3er's input when establishin? a control. At General 
Dynamics, installing a dial-back' system was. made smoother 
through management involvement. MGetting them involved and 
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informed early was critical to our success," sa.::! W. E.· 
Tucker, the project manager (Leemah, 1986). 
Before GO's dial-in system was even up, users were 
informed that a change was on the way. By notifying them 
gar.ly, Tucker believes he minimized the resistance to change. 
An explanation of the system and its purpose removed· any 
resist.ance (.Leemah, 1986) . 
General Dynamics also incorporates security into 
its organizational culture by including it in its .. motto: 
Security in my job means job security and I take it seriously 
(Leemah, 1986) . 
Status symbols at General Dynamics are "Official 
Comput~r Crime Fighter" sweatshirts and windbreakers, which 
are awarded to employees who display a high level of security 
awal:-eness (Leemah, 1986) . Involvement of the user into as 
many aspects of security as possible 'is the best way to 
encourage a secui:e networking syst:.em. 
c . '1'rainiD9 
Initial·training and regular retraining' sessions 
should b4!!1 planned for all employees who work in. a network 
environment. Too often_. ·"on the job training" reallf means no 
training at all. Unde~ such circ~stances, that users fail to 
understand their security responsibilities should come as no 
surprisll!t. 
Frequently, security programs are per~eived . 




Security officers are people who tell users what they cannot 
do, who make it harder to do the job. Security decisions seem 
to protect the system and the organization, without concern 
for the rights, needs, or efficiencies of the individual 
·worker. 
While security systems unavoidably include 
restrictive provisions, positive aspects should be emphasized. 
Encourage correct actions as well as prohibiting the 
incorrect. Stress the positive goals of the security program, 
goals with which all employees are generally ·in agreement. If 
people recognize security goals as their own; they will comply 
with security directives because doing so is in accord with 
their own individual interests. 
Remember that security is as much p~ychology as 
technology. Perceptions are important. If people believe a 
system is secure, they will be less likely to attempt to 
circumvent it.' If they feel a system is fair and sensible, 
they will be .more willing to abide by its provisions. 
Training in the purposes behind security contr'ols that· apply 
' ' ' 
to the group will go. ~ar in generating support for the sys~em. 
All·usera have to be brought into a peer grcup, 
othe~ise peer influence is unlikely to affect ·them. Shared 
conferences and. t~aining ~rings computer users together; 
'. 
people of all ranks, fron~ executi·..r~.::. to clerks. By taking 




trained and authorized, users among them. Topics that should 
be discussed in these groups include: 
How user responsibilities as defined in the security 
policy statement affect the group and its area of 
concern. 
· .The wor1tings of the information classification system 
and the special protective measures it provides. 
· Reemphasize to employees that the company owns the 
information that it lawfully ac:quires and develops, and 
what the company expects the employee to do, or refrain 
trom doing, in that regard. 
· Remind employees of their obli;ation to protect the 
company's proprietary information, and that this is a 
condition ~f continued employment. 
· Address infractions of the information security policy. 
Discuss the whole range of disciplinary measures from 
verbal ~arnings to dismissal. Examples of past 
infractions, and the disciplinary measures taken, can 
be effective. 
Training sessions for users of a n ... :-:.work are 
important. Specific explanations of expected procedures and 
. behavior establish a security baseline. Reinforcement of 
ethical ·responsibilities can increase the likelihood that 
users behave in a security .conscious mann4r. 
D. SYS'r!QC DCPMVDCKN'r 
The beat way to deal with a aecurity.pr~blem is te prevent 
it from happening.· Many administrative practices ~an be used 
to head off security problema. These can be clasaifi~d 
roughly as organizational, workplace, and personnel strategies. 
(Kearby, 1990) . 
1. Organizational •trategi•• 
Large o~gani~stions trequ~ntly segregate, at least in 
.function, tho•• peoplw who control: 
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· The mechanical parts of the system, 
· The software that runs on it, 
• The logical. access st.ructures, and 
The actual data input and output. 
A typical organizational division is shown in Table 1. 
Precpmtly Used OrpnizatioDa1 Div!Uons of Control and Authodty 
,_, .r 
11&_.-a.&at:.&a In' t ~.~~~~:t.J.ou s.mple Job Tlt!es 
t"O'ItrOl -auiPI*lt and COmputer ap.ratota 
1 ~ry .cUa Taoe UJ:trarten• 
2 write p;Of~~· (control 
Syatellls ProgrUI!"ers 
~~- ftmc:U.on.l AppU.cation P'I'OJT..,_rs 
-
C04t.101 logical ac:c:N• 
_j U1d tunc:ticms D&taJMaae ~tt&UOS 
4 Control dlltA irP'Jt, IDdiU.cat.iaa• alld Ap,pllcetion Progr~ uaer 
output 
~igure 1. D1v1s1ons of labor and author1ty 
The idea behind this •eparation is to ensure that 
people who can access "live" data - end users - are restricted 
in what they are able to do to it, and those who'can det~rmine 
what may'be done to d&ta- pro~rammers -have no· access to 
real.data. This ~tructure makes it impossible to commit many· 
types of fraud without coll•.•si-:-·' amo:"lg two or more. 
individuals; and thus reduces the lik&lihood that such crimes 




A real danger today exists in organizations where 
microcomputers have a large ·role. While most mainframe 
operations are built around the division of labor because of 
the size of the jobs, most micro~omputer operations are not. 
It is common to find one person acting as both programmer and 
computer operator. This same p~rso~ may also maintain the 
tape and disk library, perfoLm data input, and dis~ribute the 
output. 
This person has an inviting '!''·ortunity to commit 
fraud, steal from. tpe organization, harm it severely with 
·· malicious actions again!ft the computer, or hold information 
assets for ransom. Thus even in small organizations, the 
basic divisions should be pursued. 
2 . Workplace atrategiea 
Todays workplace is that of the specialist. In small 
organizations particularly, this. can pose a serious security 
threat. . A single , worker dedicated to a data processing 
. function can commit errors or crimes without detection·. The 
organizati'on' s dependence on tha.. person can be· 
disproportional to his actual value to the. compapy. 
Cross-training. is an effective way to eliminate this. 
threat. Every employoe should be trained in :Jome part of 
someone else' a job. There should b'!! no function that only one 
person can perform. Dy ~nowing ~h~ w0rk process, employees 
will be able to perform spot checks ~n each others' work for 
quality Control and audit purpOS'!!S. 
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Problems also can be avoided by giving information 
only ou a need-to-know basis. Confidential info:cnation should 
be distributed only · to those who need it. An equally 
important corollary principle is not widely appreciated: If 
people d~ not have a need to know certain information, they 
also do not need to know it exists. Many informLtion thefts 
could probably be avoided if the thieves were unaware the 
information was there to steal. 
Minimize logon prompting. The more information an 
intruder must work to get, the more li~ely it is that he will 
give up the attempt to search for easier pickings. 
' ' 
The existence of significant assets should not be 
thrust into the public eye. Computer equipment and related 
activities should be inconspicuous. Aa a good example, newer 
computer ·facilities often are placed in windowless rooms, 
without any sign designating the activities carried on 
therein. This is an example of the principle of low profile. 
Application of the principle of low pro~ile is also 
appropriate to controls. It implies that the Yery exi·stence 
. of COiltrol measures may .in fact be withheld frOJ!l. the subjects 
to whom the controls are applied. Alternatively, the details 
of how .certain controls work may be withheld. Eitner of these 
approaches discourage attacks from knowledgeable insiders who 
mioht . otherWise reaso:-1. that th-ey '!~now how to defeat the 
controls. In general, it is a g~od 'i<;iea to restrict access to 




Another asset control measure is to lower the user-to-
terminal ratio. This will reduce, the amount of time a 
terminal. goes unattended, as well as ensure that fewer 
terminals are located in out of the way, hidden areas. 
Another wo-rkplace strategy that can be effective is to 
have on-line access to sensitive i:1formation, rather than 
printed reports. This will upgrade security. The~o ia no hard 
' ' 
copy involved, retrieval time and individual productivity 
improve, and the elec~ronic access provides a very detailed 
audit trail. 
Accountability ia a fundamental internal control 
principle, for information ayateml:l security and otherwise. It 
refers to a specific individual C..ing answerable·, reapOllaible, 
or liable for sp~~ific activities. Thus, the use of a uaer.-ID 
and a pasl!word as a means of identifying users on largttr 
computer11 is instrumental in making such users accountable· for 
the activities they perfoxm on th6se computers .. If mechanisms 
such as user-IDa and passwords didnot exist, there would be 
no wa7 of tracing spec'ific ac.tivities to the initiating 
partie.-. Without c,.1ch accountabillty, an audit :would be 
.impossible. 
Thtt operatiou of control measures should also. be 
assigned to specific individual~ ~~ least on~ indi~i4ual 
should be explicitly accountable for the proper functioning o~ 
a control. The explicit assignm~nt ~f this accountability is 
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very important· in motivating involved parties to support 
specific control measu-res. !'or example, assigning 
acco\llltability for the use .:>f a specific user-In to each 
individual is an important part o~ ensuring t.hat the user does 
not sha't"e his password,· choose a password ·that is easily 
gt.lessed, or otherwise behave in a way that compro&nises the 
security provided by p~ssword-based access control packages. 
To be able to assign accountability an\.~ ::-'!t"~r,onsibility 
eo users, the users of the network 1D..JSt b,~ •"&lidated. The 
security manager should forr11ally ver;.~y ::h·.• uti l.iz.ation of 
system resources by matching usern;smes &£~~ "0 uo~:hers against 
personnel file =ecords. He should set up an automatic 
reporting routine that will ideotify accounts that have been 
unused for a specified period o! ~~~, as they may indicate 
employees th'at havtt mo·.red or 1 ~:!t t.he ccMpany. 
~ersonnel stratll!lg;.fi!.;J sh.,uld focus on creating an 
atmosphere o~ ;A:t:ao~al 2. t:sp(.~nsibility •.nd accountability 
within the 'user ;: ;" .. 1\un.:.c:~. T~ainir.g, r~wards, and· the 
certai.aty of p•.lni<~hment · ~or wronqdoi~g c3n ~oster this 
atmosphere. 
All the methods · pre•1iously d~scrib~d have a3 t.heir . 
ultimate aim the enh.lncement •::-£ security through the 
improvement o~ human factors in the crganization. When these 






important, however, not to neglect the system once the 
procedures have been put into place. Security managers must 
be' vigilant in maintaining the environment they have worked to 
get . 
. Whether or not raality bears it out, an image of security 
and orderly operation should always be presented to the public 
and. the user population. To look vulnerable is to invite 
attack and exploitation. From a systems design perspective, 
· if an inte~al fault is detected, it should not be 
communicated to the users, but to an employee who is iri a 
position to take corrective action. 
maintain a secure environment follow. 
1. -.ployee acceaaion 
Some techniques to 
The success or failure ~~ a security program depends 
on employee attitudes. Establishing the right ·security 
mindset is a process that should begin before an eaployee is 
hired and it should continue thereafter throughout · hi.J 
employment. 
Inte·rviews are often the most important: determinant in 
hiring, but ~hey are •lao ·among' 'the least reliable and valid 
ways C'lf! selecting new employees. A resllJMo carries . only 
information the potential employee wants you to. see, with ne 
guarantee of validity and no hint or· omissioiur . To the 
maxi~um extent possible, potential employees should · be 
screened l.Jef!ore · the.y are hired. 
screening techniques. 
e.9 
T~ese are some useful 
· Check references. Although organizations are reluctant 
to provide much information about their past employees 
these daya, both firing for cause or prosecution for 
computer crime is likely to be revealed and will 
obviously be important information. 
· Confirm background information. Many items on a resume 
can and should be confirmed. Aside from educ~tional 
recorda, public recQr~ can be checked to rule out a 
criminal history. 
• Bxa.mine work samples. Ask a pe..:son to provide samples 
of past work to demonstrate job-related skills as part 
of the job-consideration process. A programmer, for 
example, can be asked for copies of code and 
documentation written previously • 
.In short, do .not trust the hiring decision to an 
inte~iew and uncorroborated resume. The new employee who .:an 
fraudulently sell himself or herself into a new job may,also 
~ successful at computer fraud. 
2. Birita9 ag:r: a •• 1ata. 
These establish an understanding between ,employer and 
employee about expected standards of.behavior. 'l'he hiring 
agreement auat be closely coordinated to the organization's 
manual of policies and procedures. The agreement can be a 
part of ~he manual or·can make specific reference to it. 
Hiring agr .... nts can be particularly useful for 
' avoiding apecific aecurity' threats. In a software house, for 
example, a hiring agreement can ~tipulate that rights to 
algorit~ and aoftware developed for the company, shall be 
the aole pro~rty of the employer. The hiring· agreement seta 
. ' ,' 
expectation• and a firm definitio" of right and vronq. 
Furthermore, unvillinqnesa to siqn such an aqref'.~ment as a 
condition of hire might be an early varninq of an employee vho 






3. Job ~scription• 
Information eecurity should be an e~ement of the job, 
descri.pti~n. If a worker is expected to conform to security 
procedures, to be &lert to and report possible security 
breaches, and to follow standards for quality assurance, th3se 
items should be included explicitly in the formal job 
description. 
The last reso~ . for shaping employee ber4&vior is 
disciplinary action. We hope that people will :L"espond to 
positive incentives, and that disciplinary actio~ ~•ll never 
be requir$d. Nonetheless, discipline mast be a part of the 
system. 
Disciplinary action must be administered only when it 
is clearly .deserved; the specific action should be, decided 
upon before .the event occurs. Disciplinary procedures that 
follow preset, published guidelines are exempt from such 
criticisms. 
S. . 1'\mctional cooperation 
The data security officer should work to establish ~ 
close and cooperative relationship with ' the personnel 
department. Many of the security concern, discussed here ar~ 
also good personnel practices for other reasons . Thus the 
security officer and the p~r~~nn~l director share many 
concerns· and goals; working together, they can achieve results 
that would otherwise be out of r~ach. 
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6. · Syst .. pe~son~lisation 
In computer crime, the fant~~y of being invisible is 
as close to.reality·as it can be. In this sense, electronic 
informat-.ion eystems can make a perpetrator powerfully . 
invisible. Unfortunately, not only is the perpetrator 
invisible, but often so is the victim. There is anonymity on 
both ends. This anonymity. aids an intruder in setting aside 
any moral restraints that he might· feel 'if the victim were 
personally kn~~u. 
One way to decrease the sense of dealing with a 
ma~hine is to personalize the system prompt. Upon request1.ng 
access to a sensiti,ve application or data set, the prcmpt 
could be: "You are trying to access a restricted area, Joe, 
are you &uthorized for this?". 'l'he system has many 
attributes, but it l·acks any kind o~ personsl ide··.tity. 
Techniques similar to· this can simulate an identity tor the 
system, and promote a sense of etltical responsibility in the 
user. 
'' 
7. sy~t-. J:eYin 
In~ormation security plans must be regu.lariy revisited 
and revised to re~lect 'new technical develo~ments· and 
environmental c~anges.· Sec\1rity managers should be aware of 
new t;echnological developments that · can ~ring with them 
desirable human factors·. Chahg~s in the organizational 
environment must be monitored. If managemen~ shakeups resu~t 





organization, security managers need to adjust controls to 
recognize that fact. 
r. SUIGGla' 
Effective network security is not simply a function of 
elaborate technology. Tight security requires an integrated 
and concerted effort. The current security system must be 
evaluated in terms of its success in reaching defined security 
goals. Support for improvement must be gained from manage~ent 
and users. A comprehensive security plan, communie~ted to all 
concerned, will aid in gaining this supp~rt. Encouraging an 
ethical environment, and monitoring it, will maintain the 
security improvements. and the enhanced· security posture of the 
organization. 
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VII. CONCLUSIONS, NCOIGGDmA!'IONS .um SUGCI:S'liONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
Human factors have a significant imr..~act c:n the p~rformance 
characteristics of network security co::1trol .~yatems. The user 
of a control is an important compone.nt of the overall 
structure of, 'security within an organi;zation. Managers who 
ignore this interaction will find that security controls are 
a barrier to organizational e:f:ficiency and employee 
accomplishment. 
The understanding and use of the human factors that impact 
network security leads to an environment conducive to 
info.rmation ethiqs, and the appropriate use of ·security 
controls. Use o:f a tool such as the S•curity Optimization 
Grid can-aid in,attaining such an environment. 
The methods thro gh which human factors'are blended with 
security controls ar not difficult. They merely require the 
attention of a secur'ty mabager who is aware o:f the exietence 
and impo~ance_ o:f th human factors, the support- of top-lev•l 
'management in the o anization, · and a program· whereby the 
methods can· .be i_mple and maintained. 
network security, th answers are: 
How clocaly related to a similar user 
experience .. 
• 
· The user's perception of how long the control takes to 
pass through. 
· How much the user feels the control interferes with his 
routine. 
· The degree to which the user feels the control is an 
invasion of his personal privacy. 
· The speed u1d accuracy with which the control can be 
accomplished. 
· The degree of involvement tha user has in implementing 
the control. 
· The amount of personal responsibility -t.....- · user feels 
regarding the use of the .control. 
· Whethar or.not the user is rewarded for proper use of 
controls. 
· The degree of management ~ommitment to security 
controls. 
To the question: How can a security manager ·~tilize these 
factors to enhance security in his organi::ation~ the answers 
are: 
· Do not force controls upon users 
· Ensure controls are fast, and accurate. 
Ensure users are compensated if controls significantly 
interfere with their normal work routine. 
Involve users in the implementation of security 
controls. 
· Ensure users p~rceive man~gement's commitment to 
network security. 
Train users in their l~gal and moral responsibilities 
toward information S:!;"Stents in the organization~ 
· Reward users for gooci ~ecurity practices. 
Managers of networks car~ying sen.sitive information shoutd 
reevaluate ~heir ~ecu'rity controls systems with regard to 
human factors . Security measures currently in place "'ere 
likely. implemented withou~ attenti~~ to thos~ factors. An 
evaluation of the system with a tool such as the Security 
Optimization Grid may improve the e-peration of the current 
control methods. 
------------------------------------~----------------·--------~-~-----------~ ·, ... --- .·.-· • •• ••• 
Organizations with network information systems should 
attempt to preate an atmosphere of ethical awareness as 
corcerns the network. The ethical standards to which most 
people subscribe are based on human interaction. The absence 
of such ethical s~andards to apply to information systems can 
create problems in the network environment. The creation and 
fostering of an envi~onment of information ethics will 
discourage misconduct in the network. 
Future security control implementations should be made 
with h~man factors as ~ ~ecision element of equal weight with 
technol?gical advancement. The attitude of the invol.ved user 
is important to the organization's effectiveness. If the us•r 
community feels neglected, or that its opinion is not valued, 
then they will atte~t to bypass, security controls. 
Addi~ionally, thei~ work performance, an critical issue for 
management, will degrade. 
C. StJGQB3'fiOHS I'OR KB'r US&UCB 
In the area of human. factors a~ they affect network 
security, the cur~ent literature, in th. field generally .la~== 
in-depth, analytical experimentation. Present studies focus 
' . 
un bord~rl,ine in~angibles such ·as u~er aec~ptance, 
satisfaction surveys, and the lik~. · What is needed . is 
·experimental, quantified data. 
For example, ~ study measurin9 the productivity of users 
. beft')re and after the impJ.ementath•n c·f $ome a-spect of a human 
"\ 
• 
factors prog~am would be usef~l. :t coul~ show definitively 
if a poaitivu correlation exists between human factors 
consid~ratione and worker oc·: ·· ut. 
Also of great sigt': :icance wou:d be an attempt to 
correlate the num:i:ler of security violations in an organization 
with the particular atmosphere '.:>f human factors tolerance and 
the ethical environment. Such a correlation would provide 
concrete evidence that the areas are related, rather than 
relying on studiflts that can only infer use!:' actions from 
similar circumstances and situations. 
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